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ABSTRACT 
  The United States’ commitment to adversarial justice is a defining 
feature of its legal system. Standing doctrine, for example, is supposed 
to ensure that courts can rely on adverse parties to present the facts 
courts need to resolve disputes. Although the U.S. legal system 
generally lives up to this adversarial ideal, it sometimes does not. 
Appellate courts often look outside the record the parties developed 
before the trial court, turning instead to their own independent 
research and to factual claims in amicus briefs. This deviation from 
the adversarial process is an important respect in which the nation’s 
adversarial commitment is more myth than reality. This myth is 
problematic for many reasons, including the fact that it obscures the 
extent to which some of the most significant cases the Supreme Court 
decides, such as Citizens United v. FEC, rely upon “facts” that have 
not been subjected to rigorous adversarial testing. The adversarial 
myth exists because the U.S. legal system’s current procedures were 
designed to address adjudicative facts—facts particularly within the 
knowledge of the parties—but many cases turn instead on legislative 
facts—more general facts about the state of the world. Recognizing 
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this distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts helps identify 
those cases in which existing practices undermine, rather than 
promote, adversarial justice. This Article concludes with suggestions 
for reform, including liberalizing standing doctrine when legislative 
facts are at issue. If courts are going to turn to nonparties for help in 
resolving disputes of legislative fact, it is better that they be brought 
into the process earlier so the factual claims they offer can be 
rigorously tested. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The most dangerous myths are those that are grounded in reality. 
The United States’ commitment to an adversarial system of justice is 
a defining and distinctive feature of its legal system.1 And although 
 
 1. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 495 (2009) (“[T]he 
adversarial system itself is widely acknowledged to be a fundamental feature of the American 
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the U.S. legal system generally lives up to this adversarial ideal, there 
are many cases in which it does not.2 This Article focuses on one 
important respect in which this adversarial commitment is more myth 
than reality: extra-record factfinding by appellate courts.3 
Older than the country itself,4 the U.S. legal system’s 
commitment to adversarial justice derives from the belief that 
adversarial testing is the surest route to truth.5 More than most 
countries in the world,6 the United States remains committed to this 
ideal, trusting—at least in theory—opposing parties and their zealous 
advocates to present the court with all of the information the court 
will need to fairly adjudicate the parties’ disputes and determine the 
proper state of the law.7 Standing doctrine, which limits the parties 
that may bring claims in court, reflects this adversarial ideal and is 
routinely justified as a means of “ensur[ing] the proper adversarial 
 
adjudicatory process.”); William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 
GEO. L.J. 371, 371 (2001) (“The traditional premise of American civil adjudication is that ours is 
an adversary system . . . .”). 
 2. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 371 (“The adversarial model may always have 
been more ideal than reality.”). 
 3. To be sure, this is not the only sense in which the American legal system’s commitment 
to an adversarial system of justice sometimes gives way. Surprisingly often, for example, the 
Supreme Court will reach out to decide an issue that was not raised by the parties. See, e.g., 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 931 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (criticizing the majority for “decid[ing] this case on a basis relinquished below, not 
included in the questions presented to [the Court] by the litigants, and argued here only in 
response to the Court’s invitation”); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2353 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for deciding an issue that the parties did not 
raise). For good discussions of other situations in which courts often depart from the adversarial 
ideal, see generally Frost, supra note 1; and Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court 
Stop Inviting Amici Curiae To Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
907 (2011). 
 4. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 
64 IND. L.J. 301, 323 (1989) (“The starting points for the development of the adversary 
system . . . were all in place by the end of the thirteenth century.”). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Truth is the 
essential objective of our adversary system of justice.”). 
 6. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 382 (1982) (“[O]ur 
tradition is considered more adversarial than most . . . .”). See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, 
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001) (comparing the American 
adversarial system to the legal systems of other nations). But see generally Frank B. Cross, 
America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV. 189 (2003) (reviewing KAGAN, supra) (critiquing 
Kagan’s conclusions). 
 7. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the 
parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments 
entitling them to relief.”). 
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presentation” of issues, a presentation that facilitates courts’ ability to 
fairly adjudicate cases.8 Indeed, trial courts are supposed to resolve 
cases based on the factual records presented by the parties,9 and 
appellate courts are generally required to defer to district courts’ 
factual findings.10 
Yet notwithstanding this adversarial ideal, appellate courts often 
look outside the record the parties develop before the trial court, 
turning instead to their own independent research and to amicus 
briefs, even though the resulting factual findings will not have been 
thoroughly tested by the adversarial process.11 Chief Justice Roberts 
recently illustrated the ease with which judges can engage in 
independent research when, during oral argument in a case 
challenging the constitutionality of an Arizona campaign finance law, 
he noted that he “checked the Citizens’ Clean Elections Commission 
website [that] morning” to determine the purpose of the statute.12 
“Why isn’t [the fact that the statute was enacted to ‘level the playing 
field’] clear evidence that [the law is] unconstitutional?” he asked the 
attorney defending the statute.13 In that case, the attorney had at least 
some opportunity to respond to the Chief Justice’s research,14 but in 
 
 8. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007). 
 9. See, e.g., Sharon Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging of Inquisitorial and 
Adversarial Systems of Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 467 (2009) (“A hallmark of the 
adversarial system is that the parties control the direction of the trial, with each side 
determining what facts to enter in evidence, what witnesses to call, what arguments to make, 
and what objections to raise.”); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity 
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1181, 1187 (2005) (“The adversarial and inquisitorial models are distinguished primarily by 
whether the parties or the court control three key aspects of the litigation: initiating the action, 
gathering the evidence, and determining the sequence and nature of the proceedings.”). 
 10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other 
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due 
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”); Mickens v. Taylor, 
535 U.S. 162, 177 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Our role is to defer to the District Court’s 
factual findings unless we can conclude they are clearly erroneous.”). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (No. 10-238). 
 13. Id. 
 14. The opportunity was hardly complete, however, because Justice Alito interrupted while 
the attorney was in the middle of his response to the Chief Justice. See id. (“Well, Mr. Chief 
Justice, whatever the Citizens Clean Elections Commission says on its web site I think isn’t 
dispositive of what the voters of Arizona had in mind when they passed this initiative. The 
Court—this Court has recognized since Buckley that public financing serves a valid 
anticorruption purpose, and it does so because it eliminates the influence of private 
contributions on the candidates who take public financing. And it—”). 
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many cases, the parties will not know—and thus cannot respond—
when judges engage in independent research. Moreover, page 
limitations on briefs, time constraints on oral argument, and the 
general opacity of the appellate process may prevent thorough 
adversarial testing of the factual claims presented in amicus briefs. 
This reliance on extra-record facts that have not been thoroughly 
tested by the adversarial process helps contribute to what I describe 
as the “adversarial myth,” a commitment to adversarial justice that 
appellate courts espouse as a matter of theory but often fail to realize 
in practice. 
The tension between myth and reality is pervasive. Consider, for 
example, the litigation surrounding Proposition 8, a state-wide ballot 
initiative passed in California to ban same-sex marriage.15 Opponents 
of the ban rushed to court to challenge it, arguing that it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.16 In the process of concluding that 
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, the district court made substantial 
factual findings, detailing—in roughly fifty pages—over eighty 
separate findings related to same-sex marriage and its effect on 
children raised by same-sex couples.17 
Some commentators hailed these factual findings, explaining that 
they—like most trial court factual findings—would be entitled to 
deference on appeal. For example, a prominent law professor 
observes that: 
District courts . . . get to establish the facts. And appellate courts, 
because they don’t get to see the witnesses and assess their 
credibility, are supposed to accept the facts as the trial court found 
them. 
 
 15. The initiative actually overturned an earlier California Supreme Court decision 
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under the California constitution. See In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that the purpose underlying differential 
treatment of opposite-sex and same-sex couples embodied in California’s current marriage 
statutes—the interest in retaining the traditional and well-established definition of marriage—
cannot properly be viewed as a compelling state interest for purposes of the equal protection 
clause, or as necessary to serve such an interest.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Legal Challenges: Same-Sex Issue Back in High Court, S.F. 
CHRON., Nov. 6, 2008, at A19 (reporting that the California attorney general would defend the 
legality of marriages that occurred in the time span prior to the passage of Proposition 8). 
 17. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953–91 (N.D. Cal.), appeal pending, No. 
10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). 
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So if the Supreme Court reverses the district court’s decision that 
same-sex couples have a right to marry, it will have to do it in the 
teeth of [the district court judge’s] factual findings . . . .18 
Notwithstanding these commentators’ observations, the reality is 
that nothing in the current legal framework prevents a higher court 
from looking outside the record created by the parties and relying on 
its own factual findings to reverse the trial court’s decision. 
The adversarial myth suggests that such extra-record appellate 
court factfinding does not happen. It suggests that adversarial parties 
provide courts with all of the information they need to resolve legal 
disputes and that appellate courts need only rely on the factual 
findings made by trial courts based on the presentation of the parties. 
Yet the myth is not reality;19 instead, it obscures reality by hiding the 
pervasiveness of extra-record appellate court factfinding. Indeed, 
because the adversarial myth hides the extent to which appellate 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, engage in extra-record 
factfinding, there has been little attention paid to the fact that no 
regularized practices and procedures exist to govern such factfinding. 
Unlike facts found by trial courts, which are subjected to adversarial 
testing, facts found by appellate courts are generally subjected to no 
testing at all. This failure to meaningfully test the facts underlying 
judicial decisions undermines both the legitimacy of the judicial 
process and the results of that process. After all, appellate courts’ 
failure to rigorously test their factual findings can undermine the 
quality of those findings, even though such findings are often critical 
to the courts’ ultimate legal conclusions.20 
Standing doctrine ostensibly ensures adherence to the 
adversarial ideal and prevents extra-record appellate court 
factfinding. By allowing only adverse parties who have the incentives 
to present courts with all of the information required to bring claims 
 
 18. Andrew Koppelman, Power in the Facts, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (Aug. 4, 
2010, 10:03 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/8/4/gay-marriage-and-the-
constitution/judge-walkers-factual-findings; see also Dahlia Lithwick, A Brilliant Ruling, SLATE 
(Aug. 4, 2010, 9:27 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/2262766 (“Then come the elaborate 
‘findings of fact’—and recall that appellate courts must defer far more to a judge’s findings of 
fact than conclusions of law.”). 
 19. See infra notes 105–135 and accompanying text. 
 20. The familiar adage that “bad facts make bad law” reflects the reality that facts often 
play a critical role in shaping the development of the law. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 
U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Just as ‘bad facts make bad law,’ so too odd facts 
make odd law.”). 
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in court, standing doctrine is supposed to prevent courts from having 
to look outside the record developed by the parties.21 Yet current 
standing doctrine often prohibits institutional players—such as the 
ACLU or the Washington Legal Foundation—from participating as 
parties in cases,22 even when those organizations have the expertise 
and resources to provide the courts with the information necessary to 
resolve factual disputes relevant to the legal claims at issue and 
individual plaintiffs do not.23 Ironically, appellate courts often rely on 
factual claims in the amicus briefs filed by these organizations, even 
though standing doctrine prevents those organizations from bringing 
cases directly and from meaningfully participating in the development 
of the factual record before the trial court—the forum in which 
factual claims are supposed to be tested.24 
 
 21. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary 
System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 714–15 (1983) (“The adversary system relies on a neutral and 
passive decision maker to adjudicate disputes that have been aired by the adversaries in a 
contested proceeding. He . . . is prohibited from becoming actively involved in the gathering of 
evidence or in the parties’ settlement of the case. . . . Intimately connected with the 
requirements of decision-maker passivity and neutrality is the procedural principle that the 
parties are responsible for production of all the evidence upon which the decision will be 
based.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147, 1153 (2009) (denying 
standing to “a group of organizations dedicated to protecting the environment”). 
 23. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 891–92 (1983) (“Often the very best 
adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties 
Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the case, but no ‘concrete 
injury in fact’ whatever. Yet the doctrine of standing clearly excludes them, unless they can 
attach themselves to some particular individual who happens to have some personal interest 
(however minor) at stake.”); cf. Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal 
Sacrifice and Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1, 28 (1996) (“The ACLU, the paradigmatic 
constitutional litigator of our times, came to [the aid of an individual facing religious 
discrimination], providing the funds and expertise to institute litigation against the city and 
prosecute it to success in the nation’s highest court.”). As the last example illustrates, the ACLU 
and similar organizations will sometimes help provide courts with the information they need by 
serving as attorneys, rather than parties, in cases. Indeed, this is how some of the most 
significant legal advances in the nation’s history have occurred. See, e.g., Genna Rae McNeil, 
Before Brown: Reflections on Historical Context and Vision, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1447–60 
(2003) (discussing the “litigation campaign of the NAACP” that “culminat[ed]” in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)). But there are many other cases in which such 
organizations might be in the best position to provide the court with relevant information, yet 
do not become involved until litigation is well underway and factual development is, in theory, 
complete. 
 24. See infra note 89. 
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Although it is perhaps unsurprising that courts sometimes rely on 
extra-record facts,25 it is surprising that the phenomenon has received 
so little attention, given that it results in important factual disputes 
being decided by appellate courts, without the benefit of meaningful 
adversarial testing. The Supreme Court itself rarely acknowledges the 
practice and has made virtually no effort to square its practice of 
looking outside the record with its purported commitment to an 
adversarial system of justice.26 Commentators, too, have largely 
ignored the issue. Although scholars have explored and debated the 
significance of amicus briefs to Supreme Court decisionmaking,27 they 
 
 25. It is not difficult to conceive of reasons why courts might want to look outside the 
record developed by the parties. The parties’ attorneys may fail to adequately present the 
relevant facts to the district court, or the appellate court may want to justify an outcome that 
was unsupported by the existing record. 
 26. When a Supreme Court Justice does reference the practice, it is generally because his 
was not the majority position and he thinks that his colleagues inappropriately engaged in extra-
record factfinding to reach their result. See, e.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2286 
(2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Supreme Court briefs are an inappropriate place to develop the 
key facts in a case. We normally give parties more robust protection, leaving important factual 
questions to district courts and juries aided by expert witnesses and the procedural protections 
of discovery.”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 391–92 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“Neither the majority nor the lengthy dissent in [the Kansas Supreme Court] referred to the 
two facts that the majority now seizes upon, and for good reason. That court denied a motion to 
take judicial notice of the state habeas proceeding. The proceeding is thus not part of the 
record, and cannot properly be considered by this Court. . . . The prohibition on facts found 
outside the record is designed to ensure the reliability of the evidence before the Court.” 
(citation omitted)); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 512 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the Court for going “outside the record” to determine that Connecticut had stopped enforcing 
its anticontraceptive law). 
 27. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amicus Curiae Before the Supreme 
Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990) (discussing the 
participation of certain groups as amici curiae); Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: 
Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807 (2004) (hypothesizing why amicus briefs might prove successful); Lee 
Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici 
Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 215 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (comparing the role of amici curiae for 
Justices to the role of lobbyists for legislators); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000) 
(considering the increase in amicus briefs and their impact on the Supreme Court); Kelly J. 
Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & 
POL. 33 (2004) (reporting on interviews with Supreme Court clerks and their perspectives on 
amicus briefs); Kevin T. McGuire, Amici Curiae and Strategies for Gaining Access to the 
Supreme Court, 47 POL. RES. Q. 821 (1994) (examining the reasons that lawyers seek contact 
with amici curiae); Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. 
Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of Hakman’s “Folklore,” 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311 
(1981) (criticizing early research on the impact of amicus briefs); James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 
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have not answered the more fundamental question of why it is even 
appropriate for the Court to look to these briefs—presented by 
nonparties, after all—for factual claims.28  
This resort to extra-record factfinding is problematic because it 
means that appellate courts often rest their decisions on facts that 
have not been subjected to the kind of rigorous testing that the 
country’s adversarial system is supposed to ensure—or, in many 
cases, to any testing at all. In a world in which the relevant facts were 
all uncontestable (for example, the sky is blue, and the capital of the 
United States is Washington, D.C.), the courts’ approach might be 
unproblematic—or at least much less problematic. But, in fact, people 
can reasonably disagree about many relevant “facts” about how the 
world works.29 In such a world, the fact that a credible treatise 
presents one way of looking at the world (for example, a particular 
view of the economic effects of a merger or the environmental 
consequences of a particular action) does not mean that there are not 
other credible treatises that present alternative ways of looking at it. 
Given this indeterminacy, it is problematic when such “facts” are 
“found” by ad hoc methods without the benefit of rigorous testing 
and then provide the basis for consequential legal decisions. 
Appellate courts’ tendency to resort to extra-record facts 
presented by nonparties has developed because standing doctrine and 
 
365 (1997) (arguing that amicus curiae briefs help the Justices gauge the impact of their 
opinions). 
 28. One could argue, of course, that looking at amicus briefs for any reason is inconsistent 
with the adversarial ideal and with standing requirements. See Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and 
the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1250–55 (2011) (“[A] 
narrow reading of Article III’s cases and controversies requirement would make this 
participation of amici impossible, since under that clause only parties with a justiciable dispute 
can petition a court for redress.”). That is not my claim here, and indeed, some have argued that 
“[a] decision forbidding the courts’ consideration of legal theories not raised by the litigants 
would cast doubt on the rule of law.” Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts 
Honored the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 280 
(2000). Here, I am making the more limited claim that the use of amicus briefs to develop the 
factual record is inconsistent with the adversarial system and, at least in the unconsidered 
manner in which such reliance currently occurs, problematic. 
 29. To be sure, the word “fact” suggests objectivity and certainty, but appearances are 
often deceiving. Many so-called “facts” are the subject of significant empirical dispute, and the 
line between “fact” and “interpretation” is often fuzzy. See, e.g., Judith Lichtenberg, The Will to 
Truth: A Reply to Novick, 560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 46 (1998) 
(“[E]xplanation of fact . . . appears to be a matter of interpretation.”). Philosophical questions 
about the meaning—and even existence—of “facts” are beyond the scope of this Article, but 
what is important is acknowledging that many “facts” are contestable. Recognizing that this is 
so explains why it is so important that “facts” be tested and considered before they become the 
basis for legal conclusions. 
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the courts’ procedures governing factual development were designed 
to address a certain kind of fact—specifically, the kind of fact that is 
particular to the parties before the court. In the existing literature, 
these kinds of facts are known as adjudicative facts, and they have 
been distinguished from legislative facts, more general facts about the 
state of the world that are not particularly within the knowledge of 
the parties with standing to appear before the court.30 
Recognizing the distinction between adjudicative and legislative 
facts helps explain the existence of the adversarial myth, as well as 
why it tends to be especially problematic in some of the most 
consequential cases the U.S. legal system decides. In cases in which 
the court is applying settled law to a dispute involving adjudicative 
facts, it makes sense to strictly limit who can bring the claim, to rely 
on those parties to develop the factual record, and to require 
appellate courts to defer to such factual findings on review. In doing 
so, the courts rely on the parties with the most knowledge of the 
facts—and the parties most affected by the court’s factual findings—
to present them to the court. But practices and procedures developed 
for adjudicative facts make less sense—and may generally work less 
well—when legislative facts are at issue. After all, legislative facts, 
unlike adjudicative facts, will generally help the court decide 
contested issues of law in a way that will affect parties beyond those 
before the court.31 And when legislative facts are at issue, there is no 
reason to think that the parties before the court are particularly well 
suited to developing the factual record. Indeed, the fact that appellate 
courts so often go outside the record developed by the trial court 
based on the parties’ presentation suggests that this is the case.32 
To be sure, the parties may sometimes do a good job presenting 
legislative facts, and it is certainly in their interest to do so. But in 
many cases, they will not do a good job because they do not have the 
expertise or the resources to gather the relevant evidence. Moreover, 
even if they could do a good job, they might not do as good a job as 
 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
 31. See infra notes 167–184 and accompanying text. 
 32. Appellate courts may sometimes “find” adjudicative facts that the parties do not 
present, see, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.) (“We are, 
however, distressed at the sloppiness with which the case has been handled by both 
sides. . . . [N]o satellite photo (available free of charge from Google) was placed in evidence to 
indicate the physical surroundings [at the scene of the crime].”), but more often when appellate 
courts find facts that were not presented by the parties below, they will be “legislative” in 
nature, see infra Part III.A. 
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could the broader array of individuals and organizations that may also 
have an interest when legislative fact issues are being resolved. 
Thus, adjudicative facts—the resolution of which will generally 
affect only the immediate parties before the court—are found by trial 
courts using procedures designed to ensure rigorous adversarial 
testing, whereas legislative facts—the resolution of which will often 
affect far more individuals—are often subjected to no testing at all. 
And the unacknowledged way in which courts currently deviate from 
established practices when legislative facts are at issue makes rigorous 
testing of such facts even less likely. That legislative facts are 
generally most critical in cases likely to have a more widespread effect 
on society only increases the significance of the problem. 
In this Article, I offer some preliminary thoughts on how to 
address the problem of extra-record appellate court factfinding. Most 
significantly, I argue that courts should rethink current restrictions on 
standing doctrine. If courts will ultimately turn to nonparties to 
provide them with the legislative facts they need to decide the case, 
those parties should be brought into the process at the trial court 
level, so that the legislative facts they offer can be thoroughly tested. 
Toward that end, courts should also adopt practices for finding 
legislative facts that will improve the quality of their factfinding and 
their ability to transparently present the factual foundations for their 
decisions. There are several possible ways in which the federal system 
might do this—perhaps by establishing magistrates who specialize in 
legislative factfinding or a special research service to assist the 
courts.33  
Whatever the ultimate answer, appellate courts should, in the 
meantime, remand to the trial courts when they are facing an 
inadequate factual record. Trial courts, with the assistance of both the 
parties and invited amici, can facilitate the kind of adversarial testing 
of legislative facts that the current system rarely provides.  
In Part I of this Article, I explore how the American legal 
system’s faith in the adversarial system manifests itself in the courts’ 
doctrine and practices. I focus on standing doctrine and the treatment 
of factual development by courts as two examples of the more general 
 
 33. Although such tools may be no more adversarial than the status quo, they would, in 
theory, provide more meaningful assurances of the quality of the resulting factual findings than 
currently exist. My point, after all, is not that adversarial testing is the only means by which 
factual findings can be developed, but simply that the assumption that the factual findings in 
appellate court opinions are currently being subjected to such testing is often misplaced. It is 
important to recognize the myth and then to think broadly about possible means to address it. 
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phenomenon by which American courts claim to rely on adversarial 
parties to improve the quality of judicial decisionmaking. 
In Part II, I expose this faith as a myth by discussing the repeated 
failure of courts to adhere to this adversarial ideal. Specifically, I 
explore numerous examples of appellate courts choosing not to rely 
on the facts developed by the parties and instead looking outside the 
record for the facts on which they will ultimately rest their decisions. I 
follow this anecdotal evidence with a discussion of one formalized 
mechanism by which appellate courts—and particularly the Supreme 
Court—invite nonparties to provide extra-record facts: the amicus 
brief. 
In Part III, I explore the source of this tension—namely, that the 
adversarial system and the rules that go with it were designed for 
adjudicative facts and make much less sense in the context of 
legislative facts. Resolving disputes about legislative facts is often an 
essential part of the task of judging, but courts’ unwillingness to 
acknowledge this aspect of their role leads them to ignore the fact 
that they are resolving these kinds of factual questions. 
In Part IV, I explain why this disconnect is problematic, focusing 
on four consequences in particular: (a) the courts’ reliance on 
unfounded assumptions, rather than tested facts; (b) the lack of 
established guidelines for the development and testing of legislative 
facts; (c) the lack of transparency about courts’ rationales in judicial 
opinions; and (d) the entrenchment in law of factual claims that 
should be subject to reconsideration as the world—and one’s means 
of understanding it—changes. I also raise the larger question of 
whether a court structure that was designed for private adversarial 
disputes that turn on adjudicative facts makes as much sense for more 
public claims that turn instead on legislative facts. 
Finally, in Part V, I provide some preliminary thoughts on how 
to address these problems. In particular, I argue that the current 
restrictions on standing doctrine should be reconsidered because 
allowing more parties into the process earlier may accomplish what 
standing has not: a complete record for court decisions. I also argue 
that rules and practices are needed to guide the development of 
legislative facts. The U.S. legal system has largely taken shape around 
the adversarial myth; when there is a disconnect between myth and 
reality—as there is in the context of legislative facts—it is time to 
figure out how best to bring the two into alignment.  
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I.  UNDERSTANDING THE MYTH 
As I have noted, the American legal system is grounded in a 
commitment to an adversarial system of justice, one that relies on 
opposing parties to provide the court with the information and the 
arguments that it needs to decide both the meaning of the law and 
how it should apply in particular cases.34 Even if this vision of an 
adversarial system is in many respects a myth that imperfectly 
captures the work of the courts, the commitment to this ideal 
pervades the whole of the American legal system—manifesting itself 
in both the cases the system considers and the processes by which it 
resolves them.  
But the American legal system does not value adversarial 
competition simply for adversarial competition’s own sake, nor does 
the system value it simply for the instrumental benefits it might seem 
to offer over alternative models.35 Rather, the adversarial ideal is 
inextricably connected to the popular view that courts should play a 
limited role in a democratic society; it both ensures that courts do not 
exceed their proper role and provides them with a means of filling 
that role well.36 I begin by discussing the traditional understanding of 
the proper role of courts in a democratic society and then explain how 
adversarialism advances that role. Finally, I show the importance of 
this ideal by discussing how it dictates a significant aspect of court 
practice and procedure.37 
 
 34. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. 
 35. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1670 
(2009) (noting the argument “that the adversary system is simply better than the inquisitorial 
system—better at finding the truth, or better at protecting individual rights, or better at 
guarding against abuses of power, or better at some combination of those tasks”—and 
recognizing that “[t]here are hints of this argument . . . in certain decisions of the Supreme 
Court”). 
 36. See infra Part I.B. 
 37. I should note at the outset that the purpose of this Article is not to engage with the 
comprehensive literature on the strengths and weaknesses of an adversarial system of justice, 
especially as compared to other comparative models. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985) (“[T]he familiar contrast 
between our adversarial procedure and the supposedly nonadversarial procedure of the 
Continental tradition has been grossly overdrawn.”). My point is simply that the U.S. legal 
system is, in its essential attributes, an adversarial one—and yet it departs from that adversarial 
commitment in ways that deserve greater attention than they have heretofore received. 
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A.  Courts as “Mere Instruments of the Law”38 
Although there may be no statement in legal discourse that is 
more quoted than Chief Justice Marshall’s famous conclusion (and 
premise) in Marbury v. Madison39 that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”40 
this statement is at odds with what the primary “duty of the judicial 
department” is typically understood to be—namely, to resolve private 
disputes between individual litigants.41 In fulfilling this role, courts 
consider the evidence and listen to the arguments presented by 
individual litigants and then issue decisions binding only those 
 
 38. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 40. Id. at 177. 
 41. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
357 (1978) (“The normal occasion for a resort to adjudication is when parties are at odds with 
one another, often to such a degree that a breach of social order is threatened.”). Of course, the 
nature of adjudication has shifted over time as courts have become more involved in litigation 
raising public-law claims. See Chris H. Miller, The Adaptive American Judiciary: From Classical 
Adjudication to Class Action Litigation, 72 ALB. L. REV. 117, 129 (2009) (“[T]he courts have 
traditionally dealt with private disputes between two parties, then moved to large public-type 
disputes, and currently involve themselves in a great deal of aggregated private disputes.” 
(footnotes omitted)); see also Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-
Government Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 837 
n.2 (2002) (discussing the development of “two distinctive models of adjudication:” the 
“traditional or ‘dispute resolution’ model[, which] centers on the resolution of controversies that 
involve only the interests of those immediately before the court,” and the “public law model of 
legal decision-making[, which] focuses on vindicating public values, including constitutional 
principles, and has a unique forward-looking character”). Indeed, courts’ roles in resolving such 
controversies may have contributed to the adversarial myth. As the courts have moved toward 
resolving more public-law issues, more cases may have arisen in which the parties are ill suited 
to presenting all of the relevant facts and in which courts, as a consequence, have looked outside 
the record to facts presented by nonparties. Cf. Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The 
Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 660–61 
(1988) (“[The] legitimation of change in the law and of courts as the locus for testing legal 
principles against empirical observation and the social welfare opened the door to an expanded 
role for facts in the judicial process and particularly in constitutional adjudication.” (footnote 
omitted)). Technological innovation, such as the advent of the Internet, may also have 
accelerated this departure from the adversarial ideal. After all, although judges certainly 
engaged in independent research before the Internet, see, e.g., Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome 
A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the 
Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1215–16 (1975) (“[Justices] 
conduct . . . independent research; they send their law clerks scurrying through the libraries and 
elsewhere . . . to add to the totality of knowledge about the social issues that they must decide as 
lawyers.”), there can be no doubt that the Internet has made such independent research far 
easier, see supra notes 12–13. 
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parties.42 It is black-letter law that individuals who did not have an 
opportunity to be heard cannot be bound by a court’s judgment.43 
To be sure, in the context of resolving private disputes, courts 
will, at times, make more general statements about the law, 
statements that will have an impact on individuals other than the 
parties before them.44 Although such general statements may be an 
inevitable—and even beneficial—part of judging,45 the fact that they 
are always made in the context of litigation between adverse parties is 
supposed to ensure that courts do not exceed their limited role in a 
democratic society.46 After all, the primary role of the courts is to 
apply the law; responsibility for making the law rests with elected 
legislators who are better positioned, both institutionally and as a 
matter of democratic theory, to choose among competing policy 
positions and values.47 
 
 42. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Nat’l Bank, 102 U.S. 14, 21 (1880) (“Personal judgments bind only 
parties and their privies.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (“It is a violation 
of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and 
therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.”). 
 44. Statements in cases can affect individuals other than the parties before them because 
such statements become law that either guides or binds subsequent courts addressing similar 
issues. See generally Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 
WIS. L. REV. 771 (sketching out “a general theory of precedent and legal authority through 
historical sources”). 
 45. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
847, 917 (2005) (“[U]nless a court simply repeats the facts of a case and announces a judgment, 
its decision will almost always resolve other cases not before the court. . . . Yet most of us do not 
object to the articulation of general principles by courts. To the contrary, we believe that 
reliance on general principles promotes the rule of law and prevents judges from deciding cases 
based on personal bias.”). 
 46. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We are not statesmen; we are judges. When it is 
necessary to resolve a constitutional issue in the adjudication of an actual case or controversy, it 
is our duty to do so. But whenever we are persuaded by reasons of expediency to engage in the 
business of giving legal advice, we chip away a part of the foundation of our independence and 
our strength.”); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 
(1885) (“[The Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the 
United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to 
adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the 
Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915, 1920 (1986) (“It is a judge’s obligation to 
decide private disputes. If, as part of that process, interpretation of the constitutionality of 
statutes is required, so be it. The trigger of judicial power, however, is the protection of private 
rights.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A 
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1986) (“I believe 
that both legislative lawmaking and administrative lawmaking are superior to judicial 
lawmaking in three main ways: (1) The product is better in clarity, reliability, and freedom from 
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This view of the proper role of the courts has given rise to a 
number of doctrines intended to ensure that courts do not breach 
these limits on their role. Whether limiting the type of claim that can 
be brought,48 who can bring a claim,49 or when,50 these doctrines all 
embody “an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a 
rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential 
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our 
kind of government.”51 Much has been written about these doctrines,52 
but what is important for present purposes is that they all serve—and 
are served by—the myth of the adversarial system of justice: by 
asserting that courts can only decide concrete and active disputes, 
they contribute to the notion that the role of the courts is not to make 
law, but rather to apply it in the context of resolving disputes between 
adversarial parties. 
In the next Section, I focus on one of these doctrines—
standing—and discuss the respects in which it, and the adversity it is 
supposed to ensure, helps maintain the proper role of the courts. 
Although the Court’s framing of standing doctrine and its 
requirements has evolved over time, standing has always been 
designed to protect, implicitly or otherwise, the proper role of the 
 
conflict; (2) the legislative process and the administrative process are more democratic than the 
judicial process; and (3) the factual base for legislation and for administrative rules is normally 
much stronger than the factual base for judge-made law.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(“Sometimes . . . the judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of 
unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no 
judicially enforceable rights. Such questions are said to be ‘nonjusticiable,’ or ‘political 
questions.’” (citations omitted)). 
 49. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 50. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (describing a “basic 
rationale” of ripeness doctrine as “prevent[ing] the courts, through avoidance of premature 
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative 
policies”). 
 51. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 
1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (noting that these doctrines are “founded in concern 
about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”). 
 52. For discussions of the various justiciability doctrines, see, for example, Raoul Berger, 
Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); 
Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 
(1961); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 
1363 (1973); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2007); Cass R. 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 163 (1992); and Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988). 
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courts.53 First, by requiring adverse parties, standing doctrine attempts 
to ensure that courts are deciding concrete disputes, not abstract 
questions of policy.54 Second, by requiring adverse parties with the 
incentive to zealously litigate the case, standing doctrine ensures that 
courts have the facts they need to properly resolve legal disputes.55 
Courts need such assistance precisely because of their limited role in 
society: they, unlike legislatures, have no other means of finding the 
facts that will provide the foundations for their decisions.56 Or so the 
theory goes. 
B. Standing and the Adversarial Myth 
Federal courts are defined as much by what cases they decide as 
by how they decide them. Standing doctrine, which limits which 
parties may bring claims in court,57 plays a key role in determining 
what cases the federal courts decide.58 As it is currently formulated, 
standing doctrine provides that a plaintiff is the “proper party” to sue 
only if he “allege[s] personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief.”59 Related to, but distinct from, this standing 
requirement, which the Court has identified as an “irreducible 
constitutional minimum,”60 the doctrine of “prudential standing” 
recognizes various “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction,”61 all of which are intended to ensure that the 
courts do not inadvertently enter into disputes that are more properly 
left to the other branches.62 
 
 53. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 54. See infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 55. See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 57. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (“In every 
federal case, the party bringing the suit must establish standing to prosecute the action.”). 
 58. Standing doctrine arguably derives from the Constitution’s extension of “[t]he judicial 
Power” to “Cases” and “Controversies,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, although there is much 
controversy about whether standing doctrine is constitutionally required, see infra note 295 and 
accompanying text. 
 59. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 
(1984) (emphasis added)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12 
(describing these basic elements as “familiar”). 
 60. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 61. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 62. Id. at 12. 
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The ins and outs of the development of standing doctrine are less 
important than the interests the doctrine is designed to serve. The 
Court has stated that standing “is built on a single basic idea—the 
idea of separation of powers.”63 But the “idea of separation of 
powers” is neither singular nor basic. To the contrary, there are 
several concepts implicit in the idea of “separation of powers.”64 
Professor Heather Elliott points to three in particular, one of which is 
particularly relevant here: “ensur[ing] that a particular plaintiff has a 
sufficient stake in the controversy he brings before the court to justify 
the court’s action.”65 
This function—the “concrete-adversity function,” as Elliott 
describes it—“ensures that the federal courts hear only those disputes 
characterized by the kind of adversary relationship that makes a legal 
‘case’ or a ‘controversy.’”66 In this respect, both standing doctrine and 
adverse parties help ensure that the courts do not act as legislatures, 
making general rules of policy. Instead, courts limit their role to 
resolving concrete disputes between adverse litigants.67 As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “The Art. III judicial power exists only 
to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining 
party.”68 The role of the courts is not to “decide abstract questions of 
wide public significance.”69 
Standing doctrine not only helps define the limits of the courts’ 
role, but also recognizes that because of courts’ limited role, judges 
need the assistance of adverse parties to provide them with the 
information and arguments necessary to reach the proper result.70 
 
 63. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. 
 64. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2008). 
 65. Id. at 468. Professor Elliott’s other two ideas are “prevent[ing] the federal courts from 
engaging in decisions that are better made by the political branches” and limiting the ability of 
Congress to “conscript[] the courts to fight its battles against the executive branch.” Id. 
 66. Id.; see also id. at 469 (noting that such disputes are quintessentially appropriate for 
judicial resolution because they involve the adjudication of “the legal rights of litigants in actual 
controversies” (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 
33, 39 (1885) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 67. Id. at 470; cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) (“[T]he 
Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common 
understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.”). 
 68. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
 69. Id. at 500; see also Scalia, supra note 23, at 881 (“My thesis is that the judicial doctrine 
of standing is a crucial and inseparable element of that principle, whose disregard will inevitably 
produce . . . an overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance.”). 
 70. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 
552 (1988) (“[C]ourts are limited in their ability to investigate issues on the periphery of those 
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This latter idea—that the parties’ adverseness “promotes better 
litigation”71—is regularly invoked in the Court’s discussions of 
standing.72 In Massachusetts v. EPA,73 for example, the Court 
emphasized this aspect of standing doctrine when it explained, 
“‘[T]he gist of the question of standing’ is whether petitioners have 
‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure 
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues 
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.’”74 
Requiring 
the party bringing suit [to] show that the action injures him in a 
concrete and personal way . . . preserves the vitality of the 
adversarial process by assuring . . . that the legal questions 
presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a 
debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a 
realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.75 
 
brought to them by the litigants, or even to explore the issues before them in any more detail 
than the parties wish to provide. . . . Nor could the court easily obtain the views of those most 
affected by the present practice and the proposed change. These ‘legislative facts’ are 
appropriately named; legislatures are better equipped to obtain them than are courts, both 
because of the scope of their investigative powers and because of the resources at their 
command.” (footnote omitted)). 
 71. Elliott, supra note 64, at 470. 
 72. Id.; see also id. at 471 (“The rhetoric of these cases . . . links standing to good judicial 
decision making.”). Standing is not the only doctrine that links adversity to the quality of 
judicial decisionmaking. Courts, for example, regularly decline to follow statements in prior 
cases because such statements are merely dicta and therefore are not binding on subsequent 
courts. United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (identifying dicta 
as “the part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to reject”). As 
Judge Richard Posner has explained, one reason for a court not to give dicta weight is that “the 
issue addressed in the passage was not presented as an issue [and] hence was not refined by the 
fires of adversary presentation.” Id. at 293; see also Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the 
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1261 (2006) (“Our readiness to trust a 
court’s rulings of law depends on the assumption that the adverse parties will each vigorously 
assert the best defense of its positions. The court reaches its decision only after confronting 
conflicting arguments powerfully advanced by both sides.”). 
 73. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 74. Id. at 517 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); see also Camreta v. 
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011) (noting that the “opposing party” in a case must “have an 
ongoing interest in the dispute, so that the case features ‘that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues’” (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 
(1983))). 
 75. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (third omission in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
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As the Court has further explained, the plaintiff’s 
personal stake . . . enables a complainant authoritatively to present 
to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences 
flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance. 
Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the judicial 
process, for a court must rely on the parties’ treatment of the facts 
and claims before it to develop its rules of law.76 
Thus, the commitment to adversarialism purportedly serves two 
purposes, both reflected in the Court’s discussions of standing 
doctrine: it helps ensure that courts are only in the business of 
resolving narrow disputes, while at the same time ensuring that they 
have the information necessary to resolve those disputes well. 
To be sure, as I noted at the outset, adverseness is not the only 
justification the Court has offered for standing doctrine,77 and it has at 
times placed more emphasis on other rationales.78 Indeed, the very 
 
464, 472 (1982) (noting that the standing requirement of an “actual injury redressable by the 
court” tends to ensure that legal questions presented in court have a concrete factual context). 
 76. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974); see also id. 
(“Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court, aided by parties who 
argue within the context, is capable of making decisions.”); see also United States v. Richardson, 
418 U.S. 166, 191 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (lamenting the liberalization of standing 
requirements because he feared it would result in “issues . . . be[ing] presented in abstract 
form”). In the context of prudential limitations on standing, the Court has similarly invoked the 
courts’ interest in “assur[ing] that the most effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to 
champion them.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). 
 77. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“Though some of its elements express merely 
prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of 
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 
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lack of consistency in the Court’s justifications might suggest that the 
frequent rhetoric about the link between adversity and good judicial 
decisionmaking is just that—rhetoric and nothing more. But 
regardless of whether members of the Court in fact believe that 
standing doctrine exists to ensure adversity and to promote quality 
decisionmaking,79 what is important is that they frequently say that 
they do and that the Court often premises the need for standing 
doctrine on this belief. By regularly invoking adversity as 
fundamental to the standing inquiry, the Court achieves two related—
and problematic—ends. First, it reinforces the adversarial ideal and, 
by associating standing doctrine with that ideal, both confers on 
standing a legitimacy that it has not earned and suggests a need for it 
that may not exist. Second, by promoting the notion that the 
adversarial ideal is realized, the Court obscures the important 
respects in which that adversarial commitment is more myth than 
reality. 
C. The Adversarial Myth in Practice 
The adversarial ideal manifests itself in numerous practices and 
procedures that define the U.S. legal system. For example, adverse 
parties bear responsibility for providing factual evidence to trial 
courts, which then assess and weigh the conflicting evidence. Unlike 
in other court systems, judges in the adversarial system do not 
actively seek out the relevant facts, but instead rely on the parties 
 
change.”); see also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 221 & n.10 (contrasting the ability of Congress to 
initiate “inquiry and action, define issues and objectives, and exercise virtually unlimited power 
by way of hearings and reports” to make a record with the reliance of the courts on “the parties’ 
treatment of the facts and claims before it to develop its rules of law”); cf. Neal Devins, 
Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1169, 1178–82 (2001) (discussing the argument that Congress is better at factfinding than 
courts); Kate T. Spelman, Revising Judicial Review of Legislative Findings of Scientific and 
Medical “Fact”: A Modified Due Process Approach, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837, 859–60 
(2009) (same). 
 79. There is, of course, significant literature that questions whether standing doctrine is 
merely an artifice for keeping certain cases out of court. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is 
Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–43 (1999) (arguing that “[t]he doctrinal 
elements of standing are nearly worthless” and that “judges provide access to the courts to 
individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges”). See generally 
Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical 
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591 (2010) (discussing the 
thesis that progressive Justices invented standing during the New Deal to “insulate” 
administrative agencies from judicial review). 
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before the court to provide them.80 Although there are mechanisms 
by which nonparties can intervene in litigation,81 and by which trial 
courts can solicit facts from nonparties,82 the use of such tools is the 
exception, not the norm.83 Indeed, unlike at the appellate level, the 
rules of procedure for district courts do not expressly provide for 
amicus participation.84 And although district courts enjoy wide 
discretion to invite such participation, it remains rare for them to do 
so.85 Some courts have suggested that district courts should hesitate to 
accept amicus briefs,86 particularly briefs that present facts not offered 
 
 80. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 1, at 449 (“[P]arty presentation is cited as the major 
distinction between the adversarial system in the United States and the inquisitorial systems of 
continental Europe, where judges take the lead in the investigation and presentation of the 
case.”); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Appellate Courts and Independent Experts, 60 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 303, 314 (2010) (“Unlike a judge in the inquisitorial system of the civil law used 
throughout Europe, a common law judge does not conduct his own investigation.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (providing rules for intervention of right and permissive 
intervention). 
 82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B) (providing for the appointment of a master under 
specified circumstances to “hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on 
issues to be decided without a jury”). 
 83. Cf. Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and 
Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 307 (1990) (“Several courts have relied on [a] 
comment [to the 1966 amendments to Rule 24(a)] to limit their grants of intervention.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Litigating Presidential Signing Statements, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 152 n.169 (2007) (“There is no specific rule allowing for amicus 
participation at the district court level, but it is widely recognized that district courts have broad 
discretion to appoint amicus.”); see also Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: 
The Environmental Paradigm, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 309 (2000) (“The Advisory Committee 
could encourage amicus participation in the district court by amending the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to provide expressly for amicus participation.”). 
 85. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A 
Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 687 (2008) (“At the 
district court level, amicus activity is even less significant, with the vast majority of District 
Court Judges (79.2%) responding that amicus activity is nominal or zero, and 19.9% indicating 
that approximately 5% of their docket involves amici curiae.”). There are, of course, exceptions 
to this general rule. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 n.8 (D. Or. 2002) 
(“Amici curiae briefs have been filed on behalf of the following: New York Physicians, ACLU 
Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Surviving Family 
Members, Autonomy, Inc., et al, American Academy of Pain Management, et al, Coalition of 
Mental Health Professionals, Not Dead Yet, et al, National Right to Life Committee and 
Oregon Right to Life, and the Family Research Council.”), aff’d, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), 
aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 86. See, e.g., Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1970) (“[A] district court 
lacking joint consent of the parties should go slow in accepting, and even slower in inviting, an 
amicus brief unless, as a party, although short of a right to intervene, the amicus has a special 
interest that justifies his having a say, or unless the court feels that existing counsel may need 
supplementing assistance.”); News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox, 700 F. Supp. 30, 32 (S.D. Fla. 
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by the parties.87 As one district court has noted, the growing trend 
toward accepting amicus briefs may be “useful in a reviewing court 
where, usually, only issues of law are resolved; it is not proper in a 
trial court.”88 
Once the parties present the relevant facts and law, the trial 
court is responsible for resolving these disputes in the first instance 
and for establishing the factual record on which the case will be 
decided.89 Indeed, whereas trial courts’ legal findings will be reviewed 
anew by appellate courts,90 their factual findings will be reviewed only 
for clear error,91 a meaningfully more difficult standard to meet.92 
 
1988) (“[A]cceptance of an . . . amicus curiae should be allowed only sparingly, unless the 
amicus has a special interest, or unless the Court feels that existing counsel need assistance.” 
(omission in original) (quoting Donovan v. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. 154, 159 (N.D. Ohio 1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566, 1568 (D.N.J. 
1985) (“At the trial level, where issues of fact as well as law predominate, the aid of amicus 
curiae may be less appropriate than at the appellate level where such participation has become 
standard procedure.”), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 87. See Strasser, 432 F.2d at 569 (“[A]n amicus who argues facts should rarely be 
welcomed.”). 
 88. Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418, 422 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
 89. K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the Role of 
Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 400 (2001); see also Evan H. Caminker, 
Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 41 (1994) (“Congress has vested trial courts with primary responsibility for 
different functions than it has given appellate courts. The structure of and tasks assigned to trial 
courts encourage their relative proficiency at factfinding, and appellate courts are designed and 
situated to encourage a relative proficiency at legal reasoning.”); Miller & Barron, supra note 
41, at 1187 (“The traditional or ‘Blackstonian’ conception of the judicial process clearly defines 
the formal system of information flow to the court. Under this conception, an appellate 
judge . . . accept[s] the facts as found by the trial court.”); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 234 (1985) (“[T]he categories of law and fact have 
traditionally served an important regulatory function in distributing authority among various 
decisionmakers in the legal system.”). 
 90. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 867 (2005) (“This case comes 
to us on appeal from a preliminary injunction. We accordingly review the District Court’s legal 
rulings de novo, and its ultimate conclusion for abuse of discretion.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917 (1995) (“In our view, the District Court 
applied the correct analysis, and its finding that race was the predominant factor motivating the 
drawing of the Eleventh District was not clearly erroneous.”). 
 92. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (“This standard plainly 
does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is 
convinced that it would have decided the case differently.”). Appellate courts do not always give 
exactly the same deference to factual findings in all circumstances. For example, the Court has 
recognized that even though “[t]he same ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to findings based 
on documentary evidence as to those based entirely on oral testimony, . . . the presumption has 
lesser force in the former situation than in the latter.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984). The Court has also noted that “the standard [of review] does not 
change as the trial becomes longer and more complex, but the likelihood that the appellate 
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Multiple rationales have been offered for this deference to district 
courts’ factual findings. District court judges actually see witnesses 
and hear live testimony,93 and they thus develop experience in making 
determinations of fact.94 Such deference also serves “the public 
interest in the stability and judicial economy” that comes from 
“recognizing . . . the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, [as] the 
finder of the facts.”95 Deference is also accorded to trial court factual 
findings because they sometimes reflect the findings of jurors drawn 
from the community.96 And surely an important factor also is the trial 
court’s closer interaction with the actual parties to the case. Although 
not always true, the parties generally appear and often testify before 
the trial court judge. By contrast, at the appellate court, where 
questions of law predominate, the actual parties will much more 
rarely appear or be noticed by members of the bench.97 There are thus 
practical and dignitary values in deferring to the decisionmaker who 
has most closely interacted with the parties who have knowledge of—
and responsibility for presenting—the relevant facts. 
 
court will rely on the presumption tends to increase when trial judges have lived with the 
controversy for weeks or months instead of just a few hours.” Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 438 (2007) 
(“[D]eferential standards of review grant lower court judges discretion . . . because they are 
better situated to make certain types of decisions, even though such deference may entail a loss 
of uniformity in outcome.”); see also Boyd v. Boyd, 169 N.E. 632, 634 (N.Y. 1930) (“Face to face 
with living witnesses, the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which 
appellate judges are excluded.”). 
 94. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 (“The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, 
and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.”); see also Paul E. McGreal, 
Ambition’s Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1125–26 (2000) (noting that “the trial court 
is believed to be in a better position than the appellate court to weigh evidence and find facts” 
due to the expertise that comes with experience). 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s note to 1985 amend. (“To permit courts of 
appeals to share more actively in the fact-finding function would tend to undermine the 
legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging 
appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.”); see also, 
e.g., Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574–75 (“Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of 
appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a 
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.”); Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies, 
Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 957, 978–79 (discussing the various reasons why 
appellate courts defer to the factual findings of trial courts). 
 96. See, e.g., Fredric I. Lederer, The Effect of Courtroom Technologies on and in Appellate 
Proceedings and Courtrooms, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 251, 259–60 (2000) (“In the case of 
jury trials, appellate deference is further justified by the special role of the jury as the 
community’s fact-finding representative.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 80 (2006) (“The 
parties to an appellate proceeding frequently do not appear, and if they do, they sit in the 
audience without any formal participation in the appellate process itself.”). 
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Thus, the U.S. legal system’s adversarial commitment manifests 
itself in the very structure of the court system—both in how the facts 
are presented and in which court is responsible for finding them. The 
existence of this commitment is important because it fosters 
complacency, suggesting that parties can be relied upon to present 
courts with all of the information that they need and that the factual 
findings on which cases will ultimately be decided will be those found 
by the trial court based on the presentations of adverse parties. It 
suggests that there is no reason to worry about the quality of the 
factual findings that underlie the decisions the U.S. judicial system 
reaches, at least insofar as the adversarial system can be relied upon 
as a rigorous means of testing factual claims. But, as I discuss in the 
next Part, an examination of appellate factfinding reveals that, in this 
important context, the United States’ commitment to an adversarial 
system of justice is often more myth than reality. 
II.  UNDERMINING THE MYTH 
As much as courts may tout the importance of adversarialism 
and maintain that they rely on proper parties to develop the factual 
record, courts often fail to practice what they preach. Appellate 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, routinely consider facts that 
were not made part of the record below.98 I begin this Part with a few 
examples of appellate court reliance on facts not provided by the 
parties to the litigation.99 But evidence that appellate courts consider 
 
 98. See Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 971–72 (2009) (“Sometimes the court will decide the 
case on the basis of ‘facts’ in the record not addressed by the parties—which means that the 
court’s decision is driven by evidence that the parties never explained and the meaning or 
importance of which they never contested.” (footnote omitted)); infra Part II.A. 
 99. Two methodological points are in order. First, I look at appellate court opinions 
because they provide the clearest evidence of appellate court reliance on extra-record facts. 
That said, there may often be facts that influence—consciously or otherwise—judges’ decisions, 
even though they do not make it into the official explanation of the judges’ reasoning that 
appears in a published opinion. A more thorough examination of oral argument transcripts and 
briefs might provide some sense of the extent to which this occurs, cf. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 18–19, Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (No. 01-1559) (providing the 
Court with “essentially anecdotal reports” in response to a query for factual information that 
was not part of the record below), but of course even those sources cannot reveal the extent to 
which judges engage in independent research. Second, I assume that the facts in appellate court 
opinions do, in fact, influence the judges’ decisions. Admittedly, there is a strong strain of 
academic thought that suggests that judges’ decisions are shaped more by ideology than by the 
law, see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993), and that they simply select the facts that support the result they 
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extra-record facts is not merely anecdotal. Indeed, there is at least 
one well-established and formalized method—which I consider later 
in this Part—by which they actually encourage nonparties to provide 
information different than that provided by the parties: the amicus 
brief. 
A. Appellate Courts and Extra-Record Factfinding 
As I discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court is a frequent 
champion of the adversarial ideal, regularly invoking the idea that 
courts can rely on adverse parties to adequately develop the records 
needed to decide cases. Among all of the courts in the federal system, 
the Supreme Court is in some sense the Court best suited for realizing 
this ideal. Although the Supreme Court generally hears the most 
significant cases in the nation’s court system100—cases in which one 
would want the underlying factual record to be as complete as 
possible—the Supreme Court also, alone among the federal courts, 
has a virtually discretionary docket.101 
This discretionary docket enables the Court to select those cases 
that are particularly well suited for its review.102 One might think, 
 
want, see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1419 (1995) (“The philosophy of legal realists was that judges reasoned 
backward from result to rationale, selecting rules and facts to fit into a preordained pattern.”). It 
may also be the case that judges are genuinely unaware of all of the factors that are motivating 
their decisions. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia L. Ridgeway, A 
Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
1389, 1404 (2008) (“One of the most important discoveries in empirical social psychology in the 
twentieth century is that people’s perceptions and behavior are often shaped by factors that lie 
outside their awareness and cannot be fully understood by intuitive methods such as self-
reflection.”). But even if that is true in some cases, there are many others in which judges’ 
understandings of the relevant facts do inform their decisionmaking. See id. at 1419 (noting the 
constraints on judges that prevent them from simply reasoning backward from result to 
rationale). And even if judges sometimes use facts as rhetorical tools, see id. (noting that “[t]he 
way [judges] present the facts” can be a form of rhetoric), the fact that they often use extra-
record facts as those rhetorical tools suggests that those facts are also influencing their decisions. 
 100. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the 
Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 787 (1999) (“Certainly 
the federal judges, and especially the Justices of the Supreme Court, . . . exercise an 
extraordinary degree of authority over our society and culture.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Applications for Certificates of Appealability and the 
Supreme Court’s “Obligatory” Jurisdiction, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 177, 177 (2003) (“Since 
1925, with the passage of the Judges’ Bill, Congress increasingly has afforded the Supreme 
Court unfettered discretion to decide whichever cases it chooses.” (footnote omitted)). 
 102. While the Supreme Court’s selection process is guided by substantive considerations, 
such as whether there is a division of views among the lower courts and whether the case 
presents an issue of national importance, SUP. CT. R. 10; see also Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and 
GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/6/2011  6:57:08 PM 
2011] THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH 27 
therefore, that it would select only those cases in which the record 
contains all of the information the Court will need to resolve the case, 
and would avoid those in which it would be forced to look outside the 
record for facts the parties failed to adequately present.103 Yet the 
Court regularly grants certiorari in cases that require it to ultimately 
look outside the record for relevant factual assertions, and it often 
makes factual assertions without any citation at all.104 A couple of 
cases prove the point. 
 
the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 734–38 (2001) 
(discussing factors that affect the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari), the Court also 
considers other factors related not to the substantive legal question at issue but instead to how 
well that question has been presented. For example, the Court considers whether the record was 
adequately developed below and whether there will be quality lawyering. See Abramowicz & 
Colby, supra note 98, at 1001 n.188 (observing that “one of the factors that has influenced the 
Court’s decisions to deny certiorari is the presence of ‘poor lawyering’” (quoting Stephen M. 
Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, LITIGATION, Spring 1998, 
at 25, 30)). 
 103. To be sure, there might sometimes be cases where there are strong reasons for the 
Court to grant certiorari, notwithstanding the fact that the case is not otherwise well presented 
for review. Moreover, the Court’s ability to assess the adequacy of the record based on the 
materials that are submitted at the certiorari stage is not perfect. But even if there are some 
cases that fall into each of these categories, one would still think that cases in which the Court 
looks outside the record developed below would be the exception, not the rule. As I will discuss, 
however, the Court’s reliance on extra-record factual development has become an accepted part 
of its practice. 
 104. Although the Court surely sometimes regrets its decision to grant certiorari in a 
particular case, see, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the 
Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1082–95 (1988) (discussing “DIGs”—cases the Court 
decides to dismiss after having granted certiorari), the Court has ample opportunity prior to 
granting certiorari to determine whether there is an adequate factual record, see, e.g., Margaret 
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential 
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 390 (2004) (“[T]he 
Justices typically make decisions about whether to grant certiorari according to vague guidelines 
that afford them maximum discretion . . . .”); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard 
Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 791 (2001) 
(noting the existence of the “cert pool” in addition to “individualized screening mechanisms”); 
cf. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari 
Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 974–76 (2007) (book review) (arguing that the process for 
reviewing certiorari petitions tends to encourage the denial of petitions, not the granting of 
them). 
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In Citizens United v. FEC,105 a significant corporate speech case,106 
the Supreme Court overruled long-standing precedent and held 
unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited “corporations and 
unions from using their general treasury funds” to engage in political 
speech.107 In reaching this result, the Court repeatedly relied on facts 
that were not part of the record created by the parties below.108 
Throughout the Court’s analysis, it made factual assertions with 
citation only to an amicus brief or, even more disturbingly, without 
citation at all. Indeed, there was little evidence in the Court’s opinion 
of any record developed by the adversaries who had litigated the case 
below.109 
 
 105. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 106. See, e.g., id. at 933 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court 
operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it strikes down one of Congress’ most 
significant efforts to regulate the role that corporations and unions play in electoral politics. It 
compounds the offense by implicitly striking down a great many state laws as well.”); see also 
Michael Waldman, Preface to MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS 
UNITED, at xi, xi (Monica Youn ed., 2011) (noting that Citizens United “ranks among the 
Court’s most controversial and consequential” decisions because, in part, “[i]n the 2010 election, 
independent spending spiked, much of it secret, with more to come”); Emma Dumain, 
Democrats Raising Money They Oppose, ROLL CALL (May 10, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_120/Democrats-Raising-Money-They-Oppose-205488-1.html 
(“Democratic operatives are racing to organize new groups to solicit and spend millions of 
dollars that the [Citizens United] ruling allowed, gearing up to play by the same rules as 
Republicans regardless of whether they like those rules. They all insist that they don’t. But after 
watching Republicans take advantage of the new rules to spend unprecedented volumes of cash 
and win House and Senate seats across the map in the 2010 midterm elections, they say they can 
no longer stand back on moral grounds.”); Lisa Rosenberg, Happy Anniversary Citizens United, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2011, 11:42 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/01/19/
happy-anniversary-citizens-united (“As a result of [Citizens United], dark money spending to 
elect or defeat candidates in the 2010 midterms topped $450 million dollars, or about 15 percent 
of total spending on elections.”). 
 107. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (considering the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b 
(2006) and overruling Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). 
More precisely, the provision at issue prohibits the use of general treasury funds “to make 
independent expenditures for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or for 
speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.” Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b). 
 108. See infra notes 110–120 and accompanying text. 
 109. To be sure, one could argue that the Citizens United Court needed to rely on extra-
record facts: a record for the facial challenge was not made below because the parties had only 
pursued an as-applied challenge before the trial court, and the Supreme Court converted it to a 
facial challenge on appeal. See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. But this situation 
was one of the Court’s own making. It did not need to decide the facial issue to intimate what its 
views on any facial challenge would be, cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1709, 1711 (1998) (“The combination of ‘narrow holding + advicegiving dicta’ enjoys a 
natural advantage over a broad holding in terms of democratic self-rule, flexibility, popular 
GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/6/2011  6:57:08 PM 
2011] THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH 29 
For example, in concluding that the provision at issue violated 
the First Amendment, the Court first determined that it operated as 
an actual ban—as opposed to just a limitation—on political speech.110 
In doing so, the Court’s majority had to explain why it was not 
sufficient that corporations and unions could establish political action 
committees (PACs) that could engage in speech. To the Court, the 
first and most simple answer was that “[a] PAC is a separate 
association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from 
§ 441b’s expenditure ban does not allow corporations to speak.”111 But 
the Court also explained that “[e]ven if a PAC could somehow allow 
a corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs 
does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with § 441b. PACs 
are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and 
subject to extensive regulations.”112 The Court went on to detail the 
regulations to which PACs are subject, but it did not offer any 
additional support for the separate observations that they are 
expensive and burdensome, other than to note that fewer than 2,000 
of the millions of corporations in this country have PACs. And to 
support that fact, the Court cited not the record below, but an amicus 
brief and an IRS bulletin.113 
Even more critically, the Court relied on extra-record facts in 
determining whether there was any compelling interest sufficient to 
justify the federal restriction on corporate speech.114 In rejecting an 
anticorruption rationale,115 the Court concluded that “independent 
 
accountability, and adaptability.”), or, alternatively, it could have remanded the case to the trial 
court to decide the facial issue in the first instance.  
 110. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech 
notwithstanding the fact that a [political action committee] created by a corporation can still 
speak.”). 
 111. Id. (citation omitted). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 897–98 (citing Brief Amici Curiae of Seven Former Chairmen and One Former 
Commissioner of the Federal Election Commission Supporting Appellant on Supplemental 
Question at 11, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205); and IRS, 2006 STATISTICS OF 
INCOME: CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 (2009)). 
 114. The Court first held that corporations enjoy First Amendment rights. Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 899. 
 115. The Court considered three possible rationales: anti-corruption, see Supplemental Brief 
for the Appellee at 8, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205) (“Corporate participation in 
candidate elections creates a substantial risk of corruption or the appearance thereof.”); anti-
distortion, see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (describing the possible rationale as an “interest 
in preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas’” (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber 
GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/6/2011  6:57:08 PM 
30 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1 
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise 
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”116 In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court did not cite the record below. Instead, it noted 
that in a case decided more than thirty years earlier, the Court had 
recognized that there was less risk of corruption in the context of 
independent expenditures than in the context of direct 
contributions.117 It further observed that “[t]he fact that speakers may 
have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that 
these officials are corrupt,” citing a statement from an earlier separate 
opinion authored by Justice Kennedy.118 The Court ultimately did cite 
a court record119—but a record from a campaign finance case decided 
nearly a decade before, in which the court was not even considering 
the same issue and in which the present parties obviously had had no 
opportunity to develop facts.120 
My purpose here is not to address the validity of the Court’s 
conclusions,121 but simply to point out the extent to which the Court 
 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))); and shareholder protection, see Supplemental Brief 
for the Appellee, supra, at 13 (“Congress and state governments may appropriately act to 
protect shareholders’ interests in avoiding unwanted subsidization of electioneering.”). The 
Court rejected each of these rationales. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 90411. 
 116. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. 
 117. Id. at 90809 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)). 
 118. Id. at 910 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 119. Id. at 91011 (“The [record in McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (per 
curiam), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 
S. Ct. 876,] was ‘over 100,000 pages’ long, yet it ‘does not have any direct examples of votes 
being exchanged for . . . expenditures.’” (omission in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 209; and id. at 560 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part))). 
 120. See id. at 933 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the 
McConnell “record [was] not before [the Court] in [Citizens United]” and that, in any event, it 
did not provide a basis for assessing the specific arguments on which the majority based its 
decision to strike down the statute). To be sure, reliance on a prior court record may in some 
cases be preferable to reliance on no record at all, but rarely will an appellate judge be limited 
to just those two options. Moreover, when he is, there are steps he should take to ensure that 
reliance on the prior record is appropriate. See infra Part V.B. 
 121. A rich literature on the Court’s decision in Citizens United is quickly developing. See, 
e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 
605–10 (2011) (examining the role foreign spending may have played in the Court’s decision); 
Alexander Polikoff, So How Did We Get into This Mess? Observations on the Legitimacy of 
Citizens United, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 203, 219–21 (2010), http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/4/LRColl2010n4Polikoff.pdf (arguing that 
“[e]vidence that corporate independent expenditures give rise to an appearance of corruption is 
extensive” and that “[t]here is no—literally no—factual support for Justice Kennedy’s” legal 
conclusions). 
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relied on extra-record facts in reaching them. As the dissent pointed 
out, the majority rested its holding—a facial invalidation of the 
campaign finance provision—on “pure speculation” about the larger 
consequences of the provision and its effect on parties other than 
Citizens United: 
In this case, the record is not simply incomplete or unsatisfactory; it 
is nonexistent. Congress crafted [the federal law at issue] in response 
to a virtual mountain of research on the corruption that previous 
legislation had failed to avert. The Court now negates Congress’ 
efforts without a shred of evidence on how § 203 or its state-law 
counterparts have been affecting any entity other than Citizens 
United.122 
That there was no record was hardly surprising: although 
Citizens United initially brought a facial challenge, it abandoned that 
challenge in favor of a more narrow, as-applied challenge early in the 
trial court litigation, before any factual record was developed.123 
Indeed, “[s]hortly before Citizens United . . . abandon[ed] its facial 
challenge, the Government advised the District Court that it 
‘require[d] time to develop a factual record regarding [the] facial 
challenge.’”124 Thus, as the dissent explained, “By reinstating a claim 
that Citizens United [had] abandoned, the Court [gave] it a perverse 
litigating advantage over its adversary, which was deprived of the 
opportunity to gather and present information necessary to its 
rebuttal.”125 
Indeed, by setting the case for reargument rather than 
remanding to the district court for further factfinding,126 the Court 
 
 122. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The dissent notes: 
[W]e do not even have a good evidentiary record of how § 203 has been affecting 
Citizens United, which never submitted to the District Court the details of Hillary’s 
funding or its own finances. We likewise have no evidence of how § 203 and 
comparable state laws were expected to affect corporations and unions in the future. 
Id. at 933 n.5. 
 123. Id. at 933. 
 124. Id. at 933 n.4 (third and fourth alterations in original). 
 125. Id.; see also id. at 933 (“Had Citizens United maintained a facial challenge, and thus 
argued that there are virtually no circumstances in which [the law at issue] can be applied 
constitutionally, the parties could have developed, through the normal process of litigation, a 
record about the actual effects of § 203, its actual burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner 
of corporations and unions.”). 
 126. See Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (mem.) (requesting reargument on 
whether “the Court [should] overrule either or both” Austin and part of McConnell v. FEC, 540 
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ensured that factual development would occur largely by amicus brief 
and other extra-record sources, rather than by the parties before the 
district court. To be sure, although it might theoretically have been 
possible for the parties to present the Court with some factual 
information in their briefs, it would have been impossible for the 
parties in Citizens United to present the Court with all of the relevant 
information in their briefs, given the strict page limitations on 
Supreme Court briefs127 and the impossibility of predicting what facts 
the Court would draw from outside the briefs and lower court record. 
If the Court’s reliance on extra-record facts was particularly 
striking in Citizens United, it is hardly anomalous. In Gonzales v. 
Carhart,128 the Court considered a federal statute concerned not with 
campaign finance restrictions, but with restrictions on the availability 
of certain abortion procedures,129 and this time, the Court upheld the 
statute.130 Relying on its own factual findings, the Court concluded 
that legitimate governmental objectives supported the enactment of 
the statute.131 Most significantly, even though it recognized that there 
was “no reliable data to measure the phenomenon,” the Court 
deemed it “unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret 
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained” 
and noted that “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow.”132 
For this proposition, the Court cited the amicus brief of Sandra Cano, 
the former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton,133 and “180 women injured 
by abortion.”134 The Court, of course, did not actually have the 
opportunity to hear these women testify, nor was there adequate 
 
U.S. 93 (2003)). Indeed, the Supreme Court does sometimes remand to the lower court when it 
believes more factual development of the record is necessary. See infra note 313. 
 127. SUP. CT. R. 33.2(b). 
 128. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 129. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
 130. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 133. 
 131. Id. at 158. 
 132. Id. at 159. 
 133. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Doe was the companion case to Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). Cano was in some respects an odd choice to testify to the adverse consequences 
of having an abortion because she now explains that she “never wanted an abortion in Doe v. 
Bolton and fraud was perpetrated on the Court.” Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary 
Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 1, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380); see also id. app. at 3 (“I was a trusting person 
and did not read the papers placed in front of me by my lawyer. I truly thought Margie Pitts 
Hames was having me sign divorce papers. I did not even suspect that the papers related to 
abortion . . . .”). 
 134. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano, supra note 133, at 22–24). 
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opportunity for the other side to give the Court a sense of how 
representative the women who had signed that amicus brief were. 
And, again, when the Court alluded to an actual court record, it was 
not the record in the case before it.135 
Indeed, even when the Court does rely heavily on the record 
developed by the district court, it often does not limit itself to that 
record. In an earlier abortion case, Stenberg v. Carhart,136 the Court 
considered the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute banning so-
called partial-birth abortion.137 In setting out the Court’s 
understanding of the factual lay of the land—information about 
abortions generally and about the procedure at issue specifically—the 
Court repeatedly looked to the “materials presented at trial,”138 but in 
doing so, it considered “[t]he evidence before the trial court, as 
supported or supplemented in the literature.”139 As a court of appeals 
subsequently noted: 
[T]he Court supplemented the district court record with information 
from a significant array of medical sources. Extra-record sources 
considered by the Court included medical textbooks and journals 
relating to abortion, obstetrics, and gynecology; the factual records 
developed in prior “partial birth abortion” cases; and amicus briefs 
(with citations to medical authority) submitted on behalf of medical 
organizations.140 
 
 135. Id. (“Any number of patients facing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to 
hear all details, lest the usual anxiety preceding invasive medical procedures become the more 
intense. This is likely the case with the abortion procedures here in issue.” (citing Nat’l 
Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated sub nom. Nat’l 
Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 224 Fed. App’x 88, 88 (2d Cir. 2007))). Most of the plaintiffs’ 
experts cited in this district court opinion acknowledged that they did not describe the abortion 
procedure in detail to their patients. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 466 n.22. 
 136. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 137. Id. at 929–30. 
 138. Id. at 929. 
 139. Id. at 923 (emphasis added). 
 140. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated sub 
nom. Herring v. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women, 550 U.S. 901 (2007). These abortion cases 
followed in the path established by the original abortion case—Roe v. Wade. In that case, Justice 
Blackmun did extensive independent research that ultimately found its way into the Court’s 
opinion. See Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales from the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation of 
Harry Blackmun’s Judicial Legacy, 70 MO. L. REV. 1075, 108788 (2005) (“The summer months 
saw the Justices scatter. Justice Blackmun repaired to the library at the Mayo Clinic to research 
the medical history of abortion and tasked one of his clerks to write this research into the Roe 
and Doe opinions.”). 
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The Court’s decision in Stenberg may be intuitively less troubling 
than the decisions in Carhart and Citizens United because the Court 
relied heavily on the district court record and because its statements 
of extra-record facts seem well sourced. Nonetheless, the fact that it 
would look to extra-record facts even when the parties and trial court 
had developed a substantial factual record highlights the 
pervasiveness of the Court’s recourse to extra-record facts. Moreover, 
this sampling of cases suggests how varied the quality of factfinding 
can be when an appellate court engages in that task with little or no 
assistance from the parties and the trial court. 
I have focused here on the Supreme Court because that is where 
recourse to extra-record factfinding is most pervasive—and most 
pernicious—but this reliance on extra-record facts also occurs in the 
courts of appeals.141 Although it may occur less commonly in the 
courts of appeals,142 that makes the practice no less troubling. After 
all, even if this recourse to extra-record facts happened only at the 
Supreme Court or only rarely, it would still be troubling, given that it 
happens in ways that are significant to the outcome of some of the 
most consequential cases the nation’s courts decide.143 But these 
cases—and the ones I discuss later in this Article—are but a few 
 
 141. See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379–405 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing 
numerous law review articles that provide information relevant to the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment), aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); 
United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing a “recent edition of a 
national magazine” to show the importance the public attached to the availability of single-sex 
education), rev’d, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). For a discussion of how appellate courts have used 
statistical studies when addressing abortion restrictions, see infra Part III.B. 
 142. I plan to take up in a different work a more systematic examination of the use of extra-
record facts at different levels of the federal court system. If appellate courts do in fact rely on 
extra-record sources less frequently than the Supreme Court, that difference surely reflects in 
part the different nature of the cases that appellate courts hear. In other words, because the U.S. 
legal system includes one appeal as of right, Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal 
(More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 62 (1985), the courts of appeals hear many more 
cases than the Supreme Court, and many of those cases will require only straightforward 
application of an established legal rule. In those cases, there will generally be no need to resort 
to extra-record facts. Moreover, as I discuss in the next Section, amicus briefs play a significant 
role in helping appellate courts find legislative facts, and cases in the courts of appeals may 
attract less significant amicus attention than do Supreme Court cases, in part because of the 
nature of the cases and in part because amicus organizations sometimes have incentives to wait 
until the issue is before the Supreme Court. All that said, it may also be that appellate judges 
tend to view their role differently than do Supreme Court Justices. By comparing the use of 
extra-record facts in the same cases at both the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, I hope 
to elucidate the answers to these questions. 
 143. For a discussion of the problematic consequences of extra-record appellate court 
factfinding, see infra Part IV. 
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examples of the recurring phenomenon by which appellate courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court, look outside the record to make 
factual findings. Indeed, one need not rely on anecdotal evidence to 
appreciate the regularity with which appellate courts rely on extra-
record facts because there is one significant respect in which appellate 
courts invite nonparties to provide them with extra-record facts: the 
rules providing for amicus briefs. 
B. Amicus Practice 
The amicus curiae—or “friend of the Court”144—brief is a vehicle 
by which individuals or organizations that would not otherwise have 
standing to participate in a case can present their own arguments and 
information to the court.145 Although amicus briefs are often filed in 
the courts of appeals,146 they are most common in the Supreme Court, 
where they are now filed in virtually every case.147 In significant cases, 
 
 144. See, e.g., 4 AM. JUR. 2D Amicus Curiae § 1 (2007) (“The literal meaning of the term 
‘amicus curiae’ is a friend of the court.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 782 n.1 (noting that “‘standing’ [has] 
limits, so a brief amicus curiae can and does serve an important function” by serving “as a 
vehicle for interests other than those of the parties”); see also id. at 783 (“The Supreme Court’s 
continued willingness to receive this rising tide of briefs from not-so-disinterested third parties 
is, in our view, tacit recognition that most matters before the justices have vast social, political, 
and economic ramifications—far beyond the interest of the immediate parties.”). Of course, 
amicus briefs are sometimes encouraged by the parties, see, e.g., McGuire, supra note 27, at 822 
(“[T]o the extent that the goals of lawyers and organized groups intersect, their mutual interests 
create incentives to build coalitions with one another.”); John Harrington, Note, Amici Curiae 
in the Federal Courts of Appeals: How Friendly Are They?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 667, 674 
(2005) (“Amici are often not only interested third parties, but extensions of the parties 
themselves. Parties often solicit amicus support as another weapon in the adversarial struggle.”); 
see also Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., 
opinion in chambers) (“[A]micus briefs, often solicited by parties, may be used to make an end 
run around court-imposed limitations on the length of parties’ briefs.”), but how involved the 
parties are in their content and arguments varies widely across cases. 
 146. See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 315, 322–24 (2008) (discussing federal circuit courts’ amicus filing rules); Harrington, supra 
note 145, at 673–74 (discussing amicus practices in the courts of appeals). 
 147. Collins, supra note 27, at 807–08; see also id. at 810–11 (noting the increase in the 
number of amicus briefs and cosigners since the 1960s); Haw, supra note 28, at 1251 (“[T]he 
number of amicus briefs filed at the Supreme Court rose 800% between 1946 and 1995.”); 
O’Connor & Epstein, supra note 27, at 315 (noting that “interest group amicus participation in 
noncommercial cases before the Supreme Court was nearly nonexistent until World War II, that 
it rose significantly after the war, and that it then accelerated very rapidly in the late 1960s and 
1970s”). 
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amicus briefs can number in the double digits.148 Although the 
evidence is mixed,149 there is a general consensus in the literature that 
amicus briefs often influence the Court’s decisionmaking.150 
The current Supreme Court rules do more than simply allow 
amicus briefs; they expressly encourage nonparties to use them to 
assist the Court in engaging in extra-record factfinding. The rules 
provide that amicus briefs should not simply regurgitate arguments 
and information provided by the parties: such briefs “burden[] the 
Court, and [their] filing is not favored.”151 To the contrary, an amicus 
brief that will be “of considerable help to the Court” is one that 
“brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already 
brought to its attention by the parties.”152 And the Supreme Court rules 
place virtually no limit on who can file such a brief. Although an 
amicus brief can be filed only if “accompanied by the written consent 
of all parties, or if the Court grants leave to file,”153 “[t]he general 
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court . . . is to allow essentially 
unlimited amicus participation.”154 
 
 148. Collins, supra note 27, at 812 (noting that in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 
492 U.S. 490 (1989), seventy-eight amicus briefs were filed, representing more than 400 different 
organizations). 
 149. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 788 (“[S]ome circumstantial evidence 
suggests that [amicus briefs] might very well be important.”); Collins, supra note 27, at 808 & n.1 
(noting that past research suggests that amici can be influential but also acknowledging 
dissensus on this point). 
 150. See, e.g., Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 27, at 373 (“Much judicial research suggests 
that the Court’s members find amicus briefs useful, borrowing from them when writing their 
opinions.”). But see Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 788 (suggesting that amici play a much 
more significant role at the certiorari stage than at the merits stage). 
 151. SUP. CT. R. 37(1). 
 152. Id. (emphasis added). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure also explicitly provide 
for the filing of amicus briefs. FED. R. APP. P. 29. 
 153. SUP. CT. R. 37(2)(a). 
 154. Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 784; see also Collins, supra note 27, at 809 
(“Though Supreme Court Rule 37 contains explicit guidelines regarding amicus curiae 
participation on the merits, in practice, the Court allows for essentially unlimited 
participation.”). Amicus participation was not always as robust. The Court has at times been 
less liberal in accepting briefs and has even encouraged the solicitor general to deny consent to 
their filing. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 785 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s 
“restrictive view” of amicus curiae briefs). In a memorandum to the other members of the 
Court, Justice Frankfurter once subtly alluded to the tension caused by nonparties making 
arguments different from those offered by the parties: “those responsible for arguing 
cases . . . ought not to be embarrassed by amici briefs that may give a different shape or twist to 
the argument . . . as the parties molded it.” Id. at 784 (omissions in original) (quoting Justice 
Frankfurter) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Black responded by noting that 
“[m]ost of the cases that come before the Court involve matters that affect far more people than 
the immediate record parties.” Id. at 784–85 (quoting Justice Black) (internal quotation marks 
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Although amicus briefs have been the focus of significant 
scholarly attention,155 there has been no effort to square the Court’s 
reliance on amicus briefs with its purported commitment to an 
adversarial system of justice. Indeed, not even the Court itself has 
attempted to explain why the practice is appropriate. To be sure, 
sometimes a dissenting justice will chastise the majority for relying on 
amicus briefs rather than the factual record developed below—in 
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,156 for 
example, a Justice criticized the majority for “not examin[ing] the 
record or the findings of the District Court, but instead rel[ying] 
wholly on the ‘observ[ations]’ of the ‘political scientists’ who happen 
to have written an amicus brief in support of the petitioner”157—but 
people in glass houses do sometimes throw stones. Justices who 
criticize the practice in one case often turn to amici to decide issues in 
the next without themselves acknowledging, let alone explaining, the 
tension between the Court’s practice and its mythology.158 It is that 
tension—its cause and its consequences—that I consider in the 
remainder of this Article. 
III.  A DIFFERENT KIND OF FACTS 
This Article has focused thus far on what I have referred to as 
the adversarial myth—the belief that appellate courts rely on the 
parties to present relevant factual information, even as they regularly 
resort to extra-record facts that have not been thoroughly tested in 
the adversarial process. This myth, in turn, is based on yet another 
myth—the notion that the role of the courts is simply to apply clear 
legal rules to disputes between private parties.159 In cases where the 
 
omitted). Justice Black thought that “the public interest and judicial administration would be 
better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule against amicus curiae briefs.” Id. at 785 
(quoting Justice Black) (internal quotation marks omitted). And Justice Burton made a practice 
of considering whether the parties could sufficiently present the cert-worthiness of their case 
and whether the amici represented one of the party’s points of view in deciding whether to allow 
an amicus brief to be filed. Id. at 785 n.4. 
 155. See supra notes 145–154 and accompanying text. 
 156. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 
 157. Id. at 472 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (third alteration in original) (quoting id. at 449 
(majority opinion)). 
 158. For example, the same Justice who criticized the use of amicus briefs in Colorado 
Republican Federal Campaign Committee has also used them himself. See Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2776–77 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(relying on facts provided in the amicus briefs submitted in the case). 
 159. See supra note 41. 
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court’s role is simply to apply clear legal rules, the standard 
procedures make sense because the relevant facts are ones 
particularly within the knowledge of those parties who will be most 
affected if the factual presentation is incomplete.160 
But there are many cases that do not fit this model because the 
relevant facts are not so limited and because the courts are not simply 
applying settled law to disputed facts. Rather, in these cases, courts 
are crafting legal rules and principles—based on general facts about 
the state of the world—that will apply not only to the case at hand, 
but to many other cases as well. Resolving these types of cases 
requires consideration of a different kind of facts—facts about the 
larger world that are not uniquely within the knowledge of the parties 
to the litigation.161 
This distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative facts—
a distinction Professor Kenneth Culp Davis discusses in his 1942 
article on “[p]roblems of [e]vidence in the [a]dministrative 
[p]rocess”162—can help explain the existence of the adversarial myth. 
Because the adversarial system and its rules were designed for 
adjudicative facts, courts tend to ignore the rules when they are 
considering cases that turn instead on legislative facts. And because 
courts have largely ignored this distinction between adjudicative and 
legislative facts,163 they have failed to recognize both what they are 
doing and the need for new rules specifically equipped to address 
legislative facts. 
I begin this Part by discussing the distinction between the two 
types of facts. I then explore what can be learned from the limited 
attention that this distinction has received in the case law. Finally, I 
 
 160. For a discussion of how the courts’ standard procedures rely on parties to provide the 
courts with the relevant factual information, see supra Part I.B–C. 
 161. See infra notes 167–174 and accompanying text. 
 162. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942) [hereinafter Davis, Problems of Evidence]; see 
also Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952–59 (1955) [hereinafter 
Davis, Judicial Notice]; infra Part III.C. 
 163. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 958 (“Only rarely have courts specifically 
articulated the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts for purposes of judicial or 
official notice.”); Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed 
Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) (“[R]elatively little explicit discussion of this 
distinction has appeared in judicial opinions.”); see also In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 
1245 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., concurring) (“The subject of legislative fact-finding is rarely 
discussed in the jurisprudence . . . .”). 
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offer an explanation for why most courts have failed to meaningfully 
acknowledge this important distinction. 
A. Explaining Legislative Facts 
In the vast majority of cases, courts apply settled principles of 
law to disputed facts;164 the main work of the court is to resolve the 
parties’ disputes about what happened to whom and when. How the 
court resolves these disputes determines how the rule of law should 
be applied, but will have no effect on the rule of law itself. These facts 
that are related to the particular parties before the court—
adjudicative facts165—are what courts and commentators most often 
have in mind when they refer to the “facts of the case.”166 
But there is another kind of fact that is no less important—and, 
in fact, is arguably more important—to the courts’ resolution of many 
legal disputes. Unlike adjudicative facts, which deal with the 
particular, legislative facts deal with the general,167 providing 
descriptive, and sometimes predictive,168 information about the larger 
world. Not to be confused with facts found by a legislature,169 these 
facts are called legislative facts because they are general and because 
 
 164. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534 (1991). 
 165. David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical 
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552 (1991); see also Dean 
Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637, 
640 (1966) (“[A]djudicative facts . . . deal with particular circumstances, relating the actions of 
the parties to the law . . . .”). 
 166. In perhaps the most famous scene in the classic film THE PAPER CHASE (Thompson 
Films 1973), the movie’s protagonist is asked to “recite the facts of Hawkins versus McGee.” Id. 
The facts he was expected to recite were “adjudicative facts,” background facts about what had 
happened to the plaintiff to bring him into court—namely, that his hand had been injured, that 
the doctor had made it worse when he operated, and that the plaintiff now sought compensation 
for his “hairy hand.” Id. See generally Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). 
 167. Faigman, supra note 165, at 552 (describing legislative facts as ones that “transcend the 
particular dispute”); see also Alfange, supra note 165, at 640 (“[L]egislative facts . . . deal with 
general problems and demonstrate a need for legislation . . . .”); Keeton, supra note 163, at 11 
(“[Legislative] facts are foundation facts. They are building blocks in the foundation on which 
the whole structure of reason is built for deciding cases. . . . [Legislative] facts, therefore, is 
shorthand for facts that serve as premises for deciding an issue of law.”). 
 168. Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 
99 (“[Legislative facts] look to the future. They tend to be facts which relate to other ‘cases’ 
which may never be decided.” (footnote omitted)). 
 169. The term “legislative facts” is sometimes used to refer to those facts that are found by 
Congress in developing a record for the exercise of one of its enumerated powers. See, e.g., 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“To the extent 
‘legislative facts’ are relevant to a judicial determination, Congress is well equipped to 
investigate them, and such determinations are of course entitled to due respect.”). 
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they are used in the course of developing legal rules.170 Legislative 
facts can take various forms; they might help the court understand the 
history of a given practice,171 identify current realities,172 or make 
predictions about the potential effects of legal rules that the court is 
considering adopting.173 Although there will be many cases in which 
legislative facts play no role at all,174 when such facts do play a role, 
they are often critical. 
In the Proposition 8 case, for example, legislative facts were 
critical to the district court’s determination that there was no rational 
basis for distinguishing between heterosexual and homosexual 
marriage. Because the primary rationales offered in support of the 
proposition were that children raised by heterosexual couples are 
better off than children raised by homosexual couples and that 
recognition of same-sex marriage would impair traditional 
marriage,175 the court’s factual findings focused on these two 
questions. These were questions of legislative fact, as opposed to 
adjudicative fact, because they focused not on any particular child or 
on any particular heterosexual couple’s decision to marry, but rather 
on the general effects of same-sex adoption on children and the 
general effect of recognizing same-sex marriage on heterosexual 
marriage. The district court ultimately concluded that the children of 
same-sex couples benefit when their parents can marry,176 and that 
“[p]ermitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of 
opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children 
 
 170. Some scholars have suggested that an alternative label is preferable to avoid confusion 
with those facts found by a legislature. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 163, at 9 n.22 (“I am 
uneasy . . . about misunderstandings that may arise from using the term legislative facts to 
describe not only those premises a legislature uses to enact a statute but also those that a court 
uses for judicial lawmaking.”). Nevertheless, this remains the most common nomenclature. 
 171. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790–99 (2008) (discussing 
historical sources to elucidate the purported meaning of the Second Amendment). 
 172. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009) 
(discussing “evidence that [section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006),] 
fails to account for current political conditions”). 
 173. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2549–50 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the consequences of the majority’s opinion recognizing that lab analysts 
are “witnesses” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment). 
 174. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 952 (“In the great mass of cases decided by 
courts and by agencies, the legislative element is either absent, unimportant, or interstitial, 
because in most cases the applicable law and policy have been previously established.”). 
 175. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 931 (N.D. Cal.), appeal pending, No. 10-
16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). 
 176. Id. at 973. 
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outside of marriage, or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex 
marriages.”177 
These factual findings, and others compiled by the district court, 
provided the basis for its legal conclusions. For example, when the 
court concluded that there was no rational basis to support the state’s 
discrimination between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, it relied 
on its factual findings, including its determination that “[t]he evidence 
shows that the state advances nothing when it adheres to the tradition 
of excluding same-sex couples from marriage.”178 A district court that 
viewed these facts differently almost certainly would have viewed the 
law differently as well. 
In the cases discussed in Part II, in which appellate courts looked 
outside the record to make factual findings, those facts were also 
legislative facts; they helped the courts formulate and apply legal 
rules by enabling them to better understand general facts about the 
world, as opposed to facts specific to the parties. For example, in 
Citizens United, the Court was concerned not with whether any 
particular corporation was burdened by its requirement to speak 
through a PAC, but with whether the requirement was generally so 
burdensome that it could be considered an outright ban on speech.179 
And the Court was concerned not with whether any particular 
expenditure caused corruption, but with whether expenditures 
generally cause corruption such that the government’s anticorruption 
rationale would be a compelling interest sufficient to justify the First 
Amendment restriction.180 Likewise, in the abortion cases I previously 
discussed, the Court was focused not on any particular woman, but on 
the general physical and emotional consequences of abortions.181 
That courts must look to such facts is unsurprising. The 
establishment of any legal rule requires some understanding of the 
world in which that legal rule will operate; otherwise it is impossible 
to determine what its consequences will be and whether its 
 
 177. Id. at 972. 
 178. Id. at 998; see also id. (concluding that the “[p]roponents’ asserted state interests in 
tradition are nothing more than tautologies and do not amount to rational bases for Proposition 
8”). The same findings supported the district court’s conclusion that Proposition 8 violated the 
plaintiffs’ rights to due process. Id. at 994–95. 
 179. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010) (discussing the “burdensome” nature 
of speaking through a PAC). 
 180. Id. at 909 (discussing the connection between independent expenditures and 
corruption). 
 181. See supra notes 128–140 and accompanying text. 
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implementation makes sense.182 As one commentator has noted, “The 
ingredients of all lawmaking have to be policy ideas and facts, but the 
policy ideas are necessarily dependent, immediately or remotely, on 
facts.”183 It is no wonder, then, that the case law is replete with 
examples of court decisions—including significant ones in which the 
courts are settling highly contested legal issues—that turn on 
questions of legislative fact.184 
This distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts helps 
explain why the legal system’s adversarial commitment is often more 
myth than reality in the context of appellate factfinding. When 
legislative facts are at issue, adverse parties have less of an advantage 
over nonparties in presenting the facts because the relevant facts are 
not uniquely within the parties’ knowledge.185 Moreover, when 
legislative facts are at issue, it generally means the court is deciding a 
significant legal question that will have an impact that extends beyond 
the adverse parties. In such cases, other individuals and entities will 
often have an interest in advising the courts. As a result, rules and 
practices adopted for adjudicative facts make far less sense in the 
 
 182. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme 
Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236, 236 (1983) (“Constitutional decisions, like all other legal 
decisions, are made by judges based upon their understanding of the world around them. Thus, 
constitutional law is determined by the judicial perception of factual reality.” (footnote 
omitted)); cf. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (“[T]he ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ include not merely text 
and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the consideration of policy consequences.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 183. Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1980); see also 
Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 949 (“A human being is probably unable to consider a 
problem—whether of fact, law, policy, judgment, or discretion—without using his past 
experience, much of which may be factual and much highly disputable.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–33 (2003) (relying on legislative facts 
about the effect of diversity on higher education to conclude that diversity was a compelling 
interest that could justify some race-conscious admissions policies). 
 185. This is not to say that adverse parties can never—or do not ever—present the courts 
with legislative fact information. They undoubtedly do. Indeed, the famous “Brandeis brief,” 
the brief in which Louis Brandeis “assembled all of the extant social science research on the 
detrimental impact of long work hours on the health of women,” was the brief for the defendant 
state of Oregon in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, 
The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 91, 93 n.5 (1993); see also Marion E. Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 VAND. L. REV. 783 
(1958) (providing background on the “Brandeis brief”). My point is simply that adverse parties 
do not have the same advantage over nonparties when legislative facts are at issue as they do 
when adjudicative facts are. Of course, even the adversarial presentation of legislative facts can 
be a distortion of our traditional adversarial process when those facts are presented for the first 
time before an appellate court. See supra Part I.C. 
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context of legislative facts, and courts become more likely to look to 
extra-record facts in such cases.186 Thus, the distinction between 
adjudicative and legislative facts helps explain why appellate court 
extra-record factfinding is pervasive and why, in that respect, the 
United States’ commitment to an adversarial system of justice is more 
myth than reality. 
B. Legislative Facts Let Loose 
Although adjudicative and legislative facts are both important in 
the resolution of legal disputes, they are meaningfully different, and 
they play very different roles.187 Given this reality, one might think 
that two sets of practices, procedures, and rules would be in place: 
one for adjudicative facts and one for legislative facts. Yet that is not 
the case.188 Indeed, whereas rules and guidelines are in place to govern 
the former, the latter remain the subject of considerable confusion.189 
 
 186. For a discussion of cases involving legislative facts in which appellate courts looked 
outside the record, see supra Part II.A. 
 187. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1108 (1997) (“[S]tarting in 1991, there has been a substantial and 
continuing increase in the Court’s citation of nonlegal sources. . . . [O]ur preliminary and 
informal examination indicates that there appear to be similar changes, although at lower levels 
and with some time lag, in the United States Courts of Appeals, the United States District 
Courts, the California Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Appeals.”). 
 188. Even Judge Robert Keeton, who claims that “the legal system has developed one set of 
rules and practices for adjudicative facts and a different set of rules and practices for [legislative] 
facts,” Keeton, supra note 163, at 14, seems to mean only that the courts regularly ignore the 
rules for adjudicative facts when legislative facts are at issue, not that there is a well-established 
set of rules and practices governing the development of legislative facts, id. at 23–24 & n.60 
(citing Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1986), for the 
proposition that appellate courts need not defer to district courts’ resolution of legislative facts 
and explaining that “[a]lthough the First Circuit did not adopt [his] identification of the issue as 
a nonadjudicative, or [legislative], fact question, one may infer that it did not apply the rules of 
law and practice that ordinarily apply to adjudicative facts”); cf. id. at 14 n.36 (“The precedents 
and commentaries cited in support of other principles also implicitly support this principle.”). 
 189. See, e.g., James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and Briefs: 
The Actual and Potential Contribution of Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 14 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 25, 26 (1990) (noting the “absence of formal procedures to assist the Court in locating 
or evaluating social science and other social fact information”); Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing 
Internet Information to Court: Of “Legislative Facts,” 75 TEMP. L. REV. 99, 103 (2002) (“No 
rules circumscribe how judges may receive legislative facts, it being a matter of their absolute 
discretion whether and how to consult them.”); Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial 
Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1290 (2007) (“Judicial notice of legislative 
facts . . . is basically unregulated.”); Cheng, supra, at 1267 (“[T]he rules governing independent 
research are astonishingly unclear.”); Cathy Cochran, Surfing the Web for a “Brandeis Brief”: 
The Internet and Judicial Use of Legislative Facts, 70 TEX. B.J. 780, 781 (2007) (“Judicial notice 
of legislative facts is limited only by a court’s own sense of propriety.”). In theory, ethical 
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As Professor Davis observes about the Supreme Court in particular, 
“[It] is a major lawmaker, but it has no procedure designed for 
lawmaking.”190 
The Federal Rules, for example, provide some guidelines for 
extra-record factfinding, but those guidelines apply only to 
adjudicative facts, not legislative ones. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 
provides that courts, “whether requested or not,” can take “judicial 
notice” of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either 
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court 
or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”191 But the 
rule explicitly provides that “[it] governs only judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts.”192 Thus, the rule’s requirement that a party, “upon 
timely request,” be given “an opportunity to be heard as to the 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter 
 
canons might affect how judges obtain legislative facts, see, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The 
Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 135 
(2008) (discussing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct), but in reality they operate as little 
constraint, see id. at 136 (“By including the reference to judicial notice . . . the Model Code 
opens a loophole. If the ethics rules are meant to incorporate the totality of federal and state 
evidence rules’ approach to what judges can ‘know’ on their own, the research prohibition is a 
narrow one.”). 
 190. Davis, supra note 47, at 5; see also id. at 7 (“[Courts] always have the needed 
adjudicative facts, that is, the facts about the immediate parties—who did what, where, when, 
how, and with what motive or intent. But courts often have inadequate legislative facts, that is, 
the facts that bear on the court’s choices about law and policy.”); cf. Usery v. Tamiami Trail 
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 245 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Though a court, with its adversary procedure, is 
not necessarily precluded from resolving issues of legislative fact, it is generally thought that 
their determination is particularly appropriate to the administrative process, where staffs of 
specialists and great storehouses of information are available.” (citation omitted)). 
 191. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)–(c). 
 192. Id. 201(a); see also United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1976) (“Rule 
201 . . . was deliberately drafted to cover only a small fraction of material usually subsumed 
under the concept of ‘judicial notice.’” (omission in original) (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN, 
MARGARET A. BERGER & JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 1 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 201[01], at 
201-15 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The 
Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, 
the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective 
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 899 (1992) (“The Rules’ failure to address 
legislative facts has been criticized as too narrow and unambitious. This lack of guidance has led 
to concerns surrounding the process for noticing legislative facts.” (footnote omitted)); Pieter S. 
de Ganon, Note, Noticing Crisis, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 573, 574 (2011) (“Judges take judicial notice 
of facts they deem relevant to a particular case. They may take judicial notice of ‘adjudicative 
facts’ . . . only when such ‘facts are outside the area of reasonable controversy.’ But no such sine 
qua non governs ‘legislative facts’ . . . . The scope of legislative facts is practically unlimited: 
Judges may invoke any legislative fact they choose, unconstrained by rules of evidence or 
procedure.” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note)). 
GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/6/2011  6:57:08 PM 
2011] THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH 45 
noticed” does not apply to legislative facts.193 As the Advisory 
Committee notes explain, “[A]ny limitation in the form of 
indisputability, any formal requirements of notice other than those 
already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and 
exchanging briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any 
level” would be inappropriate for legislative facts.194 
The appropriate standard for appellate review of adjudicative 
facts is also clear,195 but with respect to legislative facts, the question 
remains an open one. The Supreme Court has suggested that the 
typically deferential standard of review applicable to factual findings 
might not apply to “legislative findings,”196 and some courts of appeals 
have taken the Court up on that suggestion.197 
Moreover, even if courts of appeals are to review legislative facts 
de novo, the case law provides no framework for how they should do 
so. There are no procedures designed to ensure the quality of the 
sources on which the courts rely or to ensure that all views are 
adequately tested. Indeed, in the administrative context, courts have 
sometimes justified an administrative official’s decision to look 
outside the submissions of the parties on the ground that he was only 
developing legislative facts, but even in these cases, the courts have 
 
 193. FED. R. EVID. 201(e). 
 194. Id. 201(a) advisory committee’s note; see also id. (noting that judges who are 
attempting to determine domestic law “may make an independent search for persuasive data” 
and that “[t]his is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative facts”). 
 195. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986) (“[Respondent] argues that the 
‘factual’ findings of the District Court and the Eighth Circuit on the effects of ‘death 
qualification’ may be reviewed by this Court only under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Because we do not ultimately base our decision today on 
the invalidity of the lower courts’ ‘factual’ findings, we need not decide the ‘standard of review’ 
issue. We are far from persuaded, however, that the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of Rule 52(a) 
applies to the kind of ‘legislative’ facts at issue here. The difficulty with applying such a standard 
to ‘legislative’ facts is evidenced here by the fact that at least one other Court of Appeals, 
reviewing the same social science studies as introduced by [Respondent], has reached a 
conclusion contrary to that of the Eighth Circuit.” (citation omitted)). 
 197. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 135 n.24 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the Second 
Circuit “may ultimately undertake de novo review of any legislative facts found by the District 
Court on remand”), rev’d sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); United States v. 
Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740 (1st Cir. 1994) (“The clear error standard does not apply, however, 
when the fact-finding at issue concerns ‘legislative,’ as opposed to ‘historical’ facts.”); In re 
Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1252 n.11 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., concurring) (“Because the 
determination of legislative facts is thus a component of fashioning a rule of law, the clearly 
erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) does not apply to review of a federal court’s findings 
concerning legislative facts.”). 
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neglected to provide more general guidelines for how legislative facts 
should be found and how disputes about them should be resolved.198 
The one context in which courts of appeals have recently given 
sustained attention to the distinction between adjudicative and 
legislative facts is in cases regarding abortion restrictions.199 Although 
the courts seem to agree that general facts about the availability of 
abortions and the medical necessity of particular procedures are 
legislative facts, there is little agreement about what that classification 
means in terms of how appellate courts should go about finding those 
facts or reviewing the factual findings of district courts. 
In Hope Clinic v. Ryan,200 the Seventh Circuit considered the 
constitutionality of two state laws prohibiting partial-birth abortions: 
one district court had held an Illinois statute unconstitutional, 
whereas another district court had held a similar Wisconsin statute 
constitutional.201 The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that 
both statutes could be applied in a constitutional manner depending 
on how they were construed by their respective state courts.202 
Nevertheless, it granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief, limiting the 
statutes’ application to the “medical procedure that each state insists 
is its sole concern.”203 In reaching this result, the court concluded that 
the statutes, as limited to a specific procedure, would not unduly 
burden the right to abortion.204 It relied primarily on the factual 
 
 198. See, e.g., Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The attitude of the 
country of prospective deportation toward various types of former residents is a question of 
legislative fact, on which the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination are not 
required and on which the [immigration judge] needs all the help he can get.”). 
 199. In a line of cases, primarily from the 1970s, the courts also invoked the distinction to 
determine whether an administrative proceeding was properly viewed as an adjudication or a 
rulemaking. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1983) (“The second inquiry 
requires the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] to determine an issue that is not unique 
to each claimant—the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy. This type of 
general factual issue may be resolved as fairly through rulemaking as by introducing the 
testimony of vocational experts at each disability hearing.”); Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. FTC, 
627 F.2d 1151, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (concluding that the proceeding at issue was a rulemaking 
because, in large part, it was “directed to all members of an affected industry and [was] based on 
legislative fact”). 
 200. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 
(2000). 
 201. Id. at 861. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 871. 
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findings of the Wisconsin district court, but buttressed those findings 
with citations to additional studies.205 
In dissent, Judge Richard Posner maintained that he had 
no objection to a court’s relying on extra-record evidence to 
determine the health effects of “partial birth” abortion. Those 
effects should indeed be treated as a legislative fact rather than an 
adjudicative fact, in order to avoid inconsistent results arising from 
the reactions of different district judges, sheltered by the deferential 
“clear error” standard of appellate review of factfindings, to 
different records—the inconsistency illustrated by the different 
findings of [the two judges] in the two cases before us.206 
Yet, he further observed, “[W]e should hesitate to play statistician. It 
is incongruous for this court to brush aside the findings of district 
judges in other cases while bolstering [the Wisconsin judge’s] 
inadequate findings with extra-record evidence of its own.”207 Further, 
even though the question 
is rightly an issue of legislative fact, meaning that its resolution is not 
to be cabined by facts determined in an adjudicative hearing; still it 
must be resolved in accordance with the weight of the evidence, 
including such extra-record evidence as the consensus of the 
relevant expert community, in this case the medical community.208 
Appellate court cases in this area have focused on not only 
appellate courts’ freedom to review lower court factual findings, but 
also appellate courts’ freedom to revisit Supreme Court factual 
findings. Unsurprisingly, there is not a uniform view. According to 
the Eighth Circuit, when the Supreme Court makes a finding of 
legislative fact, such as “the medical necessity of a health 
exception . . . , subsequent litigants need not relitigate [the] 
 
 205. Id. at 872. 
 206. Id. at 884 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also id. at 883 (“Consistent deference to district 
court factfindings in this pair of cases would lead to an inconsistent result—the upholding of one 
statute and the condemnation of its sister. This demonstrates that the constitutional right of 
abortion cannot be made to depend on whether a particular district judge finds a particular 
physician who disagrees with the consensus of medical opinion to be more credible than the 
spokesmen for the consensus.”). 
 207. Id. at 884. 
 208. Id. at 885. Judge Posner criticized the majority’s suggestion that the statutes could be 
upheld so long as there was some “real, and not just hypothetical, support for a belief that the 
partial-birth-abortion laws do not pose hazards [to] maternal health.” Id. (quoting id. at 873 
(majority opinion)). 
GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/6/2011  6:57:08 PM 
48 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1 
question[].”209 Thus, in light of a Supreme Court decision that was 
then just five years old, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a ban on 
partial-birth abortions required a health exception.210 Although the 
Eighth Circuit’s trust in the consistency of Supreme Court factual 
findings may have been misplaced,211 other courts have adopted this 
view.212 The Seventh Circuit, however, while suggesting that it 
probably should consider the Court’s findings of legislative fact 
binding,213 nonetheless declined to do so, deciding instead to “review 
the evidence in [the record before it]” because “the Supreme Court 
ha[d] not made this point explicit.”214 The Second Circuit, too, has 
taken this view.215 
From these conflicting opinions, a few points emerge. First, many 
appellate courts view themselves as free to review legislative facts de 
novo, lest different courts adopt different positions on issues as to 
which there should be uniformity. As the Eighth Circuit explained, 
[A]ppellate courts can impose uniformity within their jurisdictions 
by according no deference to a lower court’s record-based 
conclusions. Indeed, adopting a deferential posture in such 
 
 209. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see 
also id. at 802 (“There is some evidence in the present record indicating . . . the banned 
procedures are never medically necessary. There were, however, such assertions in Stenberg as 
well.” (citation omitted)). 
 210. Id. at 796–97. 
 211. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision. Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). 
 212. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“Carhart established the health exception requirement as a per se constitutional rule. This rule 
is based on substantial medical authority (from a broad array of sources) recognized by the 
Supreme Court, and this body of medical authority does not have to be reproduced in every 
subsequent challenge to a ‘partial birth abortion’ statute lacking a health exception.”), vacated 
sub nom. Herring v. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women, 550 U.S. 901 (2007). 
 213. A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 
2002) (“[I]f the issue is one of legislative rather than adjudicative fact, it is unsound to say that, 
on records very similar in nature, [one] law could be valid . . . and [one] invalid, just because 
different district judges reached different conclusions about the inferences to be drawn from the 
same body of statistical work.”). 
 214. Id.; see also Hicks, 409 F.3d at 632 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court did not apply a per se rule but instead concluded that the “findings and evidence” in the 
record supported the view that a health exception was required). 
 215. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Stenberg does not 
leave it to a legislature (state or federal) to make a finding as to whether a statute prohibiting an 
abortion procedure constitutionally requires a health exception. On the contrary, Stenberg 
leaves it to the challenger of the statute . . . to point to evidence of ‘substantial medical 
authority’ that supports the view that the procedure might sometimes be necessary to avoid risk 
to a woman’s health.”), vacated, 224 F. App’x 88 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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circumstances could lead to the absurd result where two district 
courts within the same circuit . . . might examine the same body of 
evidence and reach different conclusions as to the medical necessity 
of the partial-birth abortion procedures, but we would be forced to 
affirm both because the question is a close one.216 
Of course, exactly what constitutes a legislative fact remains 
somewhat unclear: for example, the Seventh Circuit held that a 
district court’s conclusions about studies were entitled to deference, 
but not its conclusions about the “significance” of those studies.217  
Second, and related, even if review of legislative facts need not 
be as deferential as review of adjudicative facts, there is little 
consensus on how active appellate courts should be in engaging in 
that review. An appellate court might, as Judge Posner suggested, 
decide that it is no better positioned than the court below to assess 
conflicting statistical studies.218 As Judge Diane Wood noted in one of 
these abortion cases, 
It is unclear at best to me why the two judges in the majority on this 
panel think that they know better than the district court judge, who 
heard all the testimony and weighed all the evidence, what the 
answer is to the question whether a critical number of Indiana 
women would experience the [statutory restriction] as such a 
significant burden that it would effectively prevent them from 
exercising their constitutionally protected choice.219 
That said, one can query whether Judge Posner or Judge Wood would 
still have been hesitant to second-guess the district court if they had 
disagreed with its findings.220 
Third, there is a real danger when judges, inexperienced in 
making empirical judgments and unrestrained in how they do so, are 
forced to make factual determinations that are highly contestable and 
 
 216. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see 
also id. at 800 (suggesting that “constitutional uniformity” can best be achieved by “treat[ing] 
the issue as one of legislative fact”); Newman, 305 F.3d at 688 (“[C]onstitutionality must be 
assessed at the level of legislative fact, rather than adjudicative fact determined by more than 
650 district judges.”); cf. Newman, 305 F.3d at 689 (“Th[e] admixture of fact and law, sometimes 
called an issue of ‘constitutional fact,’ is reviewed without deference in order to prevent the 
idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from having far-reaching legal effects.”). 
 217. Newman, 305 F.3d at 689. 
 218. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 219. Newman, 305 F.3d at 711 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 220. Cf. id. at 715 (concluding that the district court’s findings should stand whether 
reviewed de novo or under an abuse-of-discretion standard). 
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ideologically laden without any guidelines. This is particularly true 
when many of the “studies” on which courts might be tempted to rely 
arguably reflect the ideological biases of their authors.221 In Hope 
Clinic, Judge Posner criticized the majority’s review of extra-record 
evidence, noting that it relied on one article, which was “not a 
medical paper at all,” and another that was focused primarily on the 
“ethical issues involved in abortion,” while ignoring entirely another 
article in the same issue of the journal that reached the opposite 
conclusion.222 In A Woman’s Choice–East Side Women’s Clinic v. 
Newman,223 Judge John Coffey criticized the trial court for basing its 
factual findings on “a faulty study by biased researchers who operated 
in a vacuum of speculation.”224 
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, there is real confusion 
about how the courts should treat legislative facts.225 As I noted at the 
outset, the courts have not adopted established practices for dealing 
with legislative facts and, as a result, the distinction between 
adjudicative and legislative facts is often ignored. It is perhaps a 
surprising state of affairs given the prevalence of legislative facts. In 
the next Section, I offer an explanation for why this might be. 
C. Willful Ignorance of Legislative Facts 
Legislative facts are, in some sense, the proverbial elephant in 
the room—no one points or stares, even though chaos could ensue at 
any moment.226 This lack of attention is, I argue, somewhat willful, 
even if not intentional. If courts were to recognize that legislative 
facts often play an important role in their decisions, then they would 
also have to recognize why legislative facts are important—namely, 
that courts are sometimes required to develop legal rules in a way 
 
 221. See Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in 
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197, 232 (2000) (“Non-legal information itself may be the 
product of biased, advocacy-driven research.”). 
 222. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000). 
 223. A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 224. Id. at 694 (Coffey, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘key’ piece of evidence relied upon by the 
district court was a study published in the . . . Journal of the American Medical Association [and] 
co-authored by a statistician employed by the Planned Parenthood-affiliated Alan Guttmacher 
Institute.” (quoting id. at 713 (Wood, J., dissenting))). 
 225. See supra notes 200–224 and accompanying text. 
 226. The abortion cases just discussed are the exception that proves the rule; there are few 
other judicial opinions that give the same sustained attention to how courts should treat 
legislative facts. 
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that necessitates evaluation of the same kind of information 
considered by legislators.227 For institutions that are committed to 
maintaining a more limited conception of their role,228 such 
recognition could prompt nothing short of an existential crisis. 
The history of scholarly recognition of the distinction between 
adjudicative and legislative facts is telling. Professor Davis discusses 
the distinction at length in his seminal work on the administrative 
process.229 In setting out a number of “broad tentative principles” to 
assist agencies in developing processes for handling problems of 
evidence, he writes that “[t]he rules of evidence for finding facts 
which form the basis for creation of law and determination of policy 
should differ from the rules for finding facts which concern only the 
parties to a particular case.”230 He explains that “[w]hen an agency 
finds facts concerning immediate parties—what the parties did, what 
the circumstances were, what the background conditions were—the 
agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts may 
conveniently be called adjudicative facts.”231 By contrast, “[w]hen an 
agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting 
legislatively, just as judges have created the common law through 
judicial legislation, and the facts which inform its legislative judgment 
may conveniently be denominated legislative facts.”232 “The 
distinction is important,” he explains, because “the traditional rules of 
evidence are designed for adjudicative facts, and unnecessary 
confusion results from attempting to apply the traditional rules to 
legislative facts.”233 
Thus, the distinction between these two types of facts was first 
made in the context of the administrative process, where agencies 
 
 227. See Davis, supra note 47, at 1 (“Even though the Constitution explicitly puts the 
legislative power in Congress, judicial legislation is so deeply established that the legal 
profession takes it for granted, as though nature provided it.”). 
 228. See, e.g., id. (noting that “criticism of judicial lawmaking is plentiful”). 
 229. Davis, Problems of Evidence, supra note 162, at 402–03. Professor Kenneth Culp 
Davis’s work focuses on “problems of evidence in the administrative process,” and his 
discussion of the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts thus examines their role 
in administrative adjudication, not in judicial decisionmaking. Id. 
 230. Id. at 402. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 402–03; see also id. at 402 (“Frequently agencies’ choices of law or policy must 
depend on fact-finding. But the fact-finding process for such purposes is different from the 
process of finding facts which concern only the parties to a particular case and calls for different 
rules of evidence.”). 
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explicitly engage in both adjudication and rulemaking. Courts, by 
contrast, are traditionally—and erroneously—thought to be in the 
business of only adjudication, not rulemaking, and they thus have 
been unwilling to acknowledge that they need facts that are relevant 
to the latter task. To be sure, subsequent scholars have acknowledged 
that the distinction is also relevant to the work of courts, but scholars 
are much more willing than courts—particularly contemporary 
courts234—to acknowledge that courts not only apply law, but also 
make it.235 
As a result, even though as a descriptive matter, legislative facts 
often are—and have been—critical to court decisions, courts often fail 
to explicitly recognize that their decisions about legal rules are 
turning on legislative facts. Whatever the explanation for the courts’ 
failure to grapple with the pervasive role of legislative facts in judicial 
decisionmaking may be, the consequences of that failure are 
significant—perhaps as significant as the influence of legislative facts 
themselves. As I discuss in the next Part, the courts’ failure to 
 
 234. The mere suggestion by Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor that unelected 
judges do, in fact, make policy was the source of considerable controversy during her 
confirmation battle. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A21 (discussing then-Judge Sotomayor’s public statements regarding 
the role of judges); see also Emmett S. Collazo, Applying the Rule of Law Subjectively: How 
Appellate Courts Adjudicate, 4 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 303, 304 (2008) (“A ritual is enacted 
whenever a nominee for a federal judgeship appears before the Senate Judiciary Committee as 
part of the confirmation process. One Senator will ask, ‘Do you intend to apply the law rather 
than make it?’ Another will ask, ‘Will you apply the words of the Constitution in the way that 
the framers intended?’ Nominees, some of whom ought to know better, play their part in the 
ritual by answering ‘Yes’ to both questions.”); Stephen Reinhardt, Life to Death: Our 
Constitution and How It Grows, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 391, 395 (2010) (“This vision of the 
judiciary as little more than umpires or referees at sporting events has become so pervasive that 
even jurists who would never contemplate describing themselves as conservatives are now 
rushing to establish their credentials as unmoved and unmoving enforcers of the proscribed 
rules and procedures.”). 
 235. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative 
Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1601 (2008) (“Common 
law courts are certainly engaged in the business of making law and policy. . . . [A]nyone who 
contends otherwise is falling into the trap of magisterial visions of the judiciary that have been 
discredited by legal realism and the work of political scientists.”); David Luban, Justice Holmes 
and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 504 (1994) (“[T]he fundamental 
insight of [Holmes’s] legal realism is that judges can make and unmake law (though they 
customarily deny that this is what they are doing) . . . .”); Scot W. Anderson, Note, Surveying the 
Realm: Description and Adjudication in Law’s Empire, 73 IOWA L. REV. 131, 133 (1987) (“In 
contrast to the declaratory theory of the natural lawyer, legal realism holds that judges only 
make law and never find law.”). But see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and 
Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 77, 78–80 (2009) (arguing that “judges have long admitted that 
they make law”). 
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forthrightly acknowledge the role of legislative facts manifests itself in 
their decisionmaking and in their presentation of those decisions. It 
also means that insufficient attention has been paid to a more 
fundamental question: Are the rules and procedures that have been 
developed for resolving cases that turn primarily on adjudicative facts 
appropriate for cases that turn instead on legislative facts? I consider 
each of these issues in turn. 
IV.  THE TROUBLING CONSEQUENCES OF THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH 
As previously noted, the distinction between adjudicative and 
legislative facts has received relatively little attention in the academic 
literature and even less in the case law. Even if unsurprising, the 
courts’ disinterest is troubling. The courts’ failure to recognize the 
distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is largely 
responsible for the aspect of the adversarial myth that is the focus of 
this Article—appellate courts’ purported commitment to an 
adversarial system of justice, even as they rely on extra-record facts 
presented by nonparties. And that myth has profound implications 
for the ways in which the courts resolve factual disputes and present 
the resolution of those disputes to the public. In this Part, I discuss 
several of the most troubling aspects of the courts’ persistent belief in 
the adversarial myth. 
A. Unfounded Assumptions 
It is often said that everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but 
not to his own facts.236 The difference between opinion and fact, 
however, is often subtle.237 Value judgments often depend, to greater 
or lesser degrees, on the resolution of empirical questions about the 
larger world, and people often assume the answers to such questions 
unless they are confronted with objective evidence that their 
assumptions are unfounded.238 When a case turns largely on 
 
 236. The expression originated with the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York. 
Steven R. Weisman, Introduction to DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN: A PORTRAIT IN LETTERS 
OF AN AMERICAN VISIONARY 1, 2 (Steven R. Weisman ed., 2010). 
 237. Cf. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous 
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 
660 n.305 (1990) (“The legal interpretation of the fact/opinion distinction will . . . ultimately 
reflect our understanding of our own culture’s separation from nature.”). 
 238. Cf. John Veilleux, Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1990 (1987) 
(“Legal scholars and parties to litigation increasingly draw on empirical evidence to challenge 
the assumptions underlying legal rules and to influence factfinding by courts.”). 
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adjudicative—as opposed to legislative—facts, the trier of fact is less 
likely to have preconceived notions about the factual questions that 
underlie a decision, at least outside of certain highly publicized cases, 
in which media accounts might inform the trier’s understanding of 
what happened. Indeed, in such highly publicized cases, there are 
often motions to change venue precisely so that the triers of fact will 
not come into the case with preconceived notions about what 
happened.239 
Yet when cases turn on legislative facts, judges—whether they 
recognize it or not—are far more likely to have preconceived views 
about those facts. Public opinion polls show that most Americans 
have views on the empirical questions that underlie some of the most 
high-profile cases that are currently working their way through the 
legal system. For example, people tend to have opinions about 
whether children are, generally speaking, affected by being raised by 
a same-sex couple, or whether the service of openly gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual individuals in the military will affect unit cohesion.240 There is 
no reason to think that judges will not also have preformed views on 
these types of factual questions.241 
 
 239. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a) (“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court must transfer the 
proceeding against that defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a 
prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot 
obtain a fair and impartial trial there.”). 
 240. Cf. Same-Sex Marriage, Gay Rights, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport
.com/civil.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (reporting polling results on public views on same-sex 
marriage and the service of openly gay and lesbian individuals in the military). 
 241. See, e.g., Miller & Barron, supra note 41, at 1222 (“The Justices bring certain 
predilections, sometimes known and sometimes unknown, to the decisional process.”); David F. 
Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1794 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)) (“Political and personal factors, according to Posner, 
generate preconceptions, often unconscious, that affect judicial decision making.” (citing 
POSNER, supra, at 11)); cf. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.) 
(“If . . . ‘bias’ and ‘partiality’ be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind 
of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind, even at 
infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions; and the process of 
education, formal and informal, creates attitudes in all men which affect them in judging 
situations, attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by 
definition, are pre-judices.”); Karst, supra note 168, at 84 (“[A]ll of [these questions of 
legislative fact relevant to a case] are answered, whether or not the judge recognizes what he is 
doing. If he does not hear testimony or receive memoranda illuminating these questions, he 
assumes their answers on the basis of his own experience and education.”); Frank S. Ravitch, 
Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? A Nonfoundationalist Analysis of Richard Posner’s The 
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 37 TULSA L. REV. 967, 975 (2002) (book review) 
(“Society is more likely to accept decisions made based on empirical approaches and data, and 
the judge is more likely to question his or her preconceptions when confronted with empirical 
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The fact that judges have these preformed views is not 
necessarily problematic. Indeed, if it were a problem, it would likely 
be an insoluble one: selecting only individuals who pay no attention 
to the world around them would hardly be an ideal way to put 
together a strong judiciary. But it becomes problematic when those 
preformed views become the basis for a court’s decision in a case. To 
put it slightly differently, when a case turns on adjudicative facts, 
there is generally little question about the relevance of those facts. 
For example, in a murder case, most jurors will recognize the 
centrality of the fact that the victim was killed between 9:45 and 
10:15 p.m. and that someone was seen leaving the scene at 10:00 p.m. 
As a result, these facts will be thoroughly tested during the course of 
the trial. In the context of cases involving legislative facts, however, 
judges may not recognize that factual findings susceptible to empirical 
investigation are central to their ultimate legal conclusions. For 
example, in the same murder case, if there were evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the court would need to decide 
whether that evidence should be excluded from trial,242 a decision that 
ultimately turns on whether exclusion would “result[] in appreciable 
deterrence.”243 The question of whether excluding certain evidence 
will “result[] in appreciable deterrence” can be answered only with 
reference to subsidiary empirical questions about police behavior and 
 
data or when adopting an empirical approach to decision making.”). There is reason to think, 
for example, that Justice Jackson’s pragmatic view of executive power was the result of his own 
experience as attorney general. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“That comprehensive and undefined presidential 
powers hold both practical advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone 
who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety. While an 
interval of detached reflection may temper teachings of that experience, they probably are a 
more realistic influence on my views than the conventional materials of judicial decision which 
seem unduly to accentuate doctrine and legal fiction.”). See generally NOAH FELDMAN, 
SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 354–
70 (2010) (discussing Youngstown). 
 242. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009) (“The Fourth Amendment 
protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures,’ but ‘contains no provision expressly precluding the 
use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.’ Nonetheless, our decisions establish an 
exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at 
trial.” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV; and Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 
1, 10 (1995))). 
 243. Id. at 700 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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what affects it.244 But it is less obvious that these subsidiary questions 
are as central to the court’s legal conclusion as the adjudicative fact 
question, which is central to a determination of the defendant’s guilt. 
If judges are not conscious that they are making decisions that 
turn on legislative facts, then they may rest their decisions on 
assumptions—often unfounded assumptions—about the world 
around them and the way it operates.245 As well educated and 
informed as members of the judiciary may be, there is no reason to 
think that they are well versed in all of the considerations that might 
inform a decision that turns on these types of empirical questions.246 
When legislators are deciding whether to enact legislation, the 
wisdom of which turns on empirical questions, they generally hold 
hearings to determine whether the legislation would be helpful.247 
Courts often issue decisions that turn on the exact same questions, 
but because they fail to recognize that their decisions are turning on 
such factual questions, they do not engage in any attempt to gather 
the relevant facts, even to the extent that their institutional resources 
might allow them to do so.248 Thus, their opinions necessarily become 
dependent upon guesswork, intuition, and general impressions. They 
 
 244. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the adoption of 
the exclusionary rule involved an “empirical judgment”). 
 245. See Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(Weinstein, C.J.) (“[W]hether we explore the economic, political or social settings to which the 
law must be applied explicitly, or suppress our assumptions by failing to take note of them, we 
cannot apply the law in a way that has any hope of making sense unless we attempt to visualize 
the actual world with which it interacts—and this effort requires judicial notice to educate the 
court.”); Keeton, supra note 163, at 15 (“Judges do come to their roles of judging with 
knowledge that has influence on their legal thinking. Descriptively that is so, whether it is 
acknowledged or not.”). 
 246. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2769 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“Experts debate the conclusions of all these studies. . . . I, like most judges, lack the 
social science expertise to say definitively who is right.”); Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a 
Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 
125 (2009) (“Because of the explosion of federal law, it has become impossible for generalist 
judges sitting on federal district and circuit courts to develop specific expertise with respect to 
many of the subjects that come before them.”). 
 247. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. 
REV. 311, 363 n.204 (1987) (“[C]ommittee hearings provide an effective and useful means of 
securing relevant facts . . . .”). 
 248. See, e.g., Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 953 (“[T]he opinion which 
specifically identifies extra-record materials used in creating law or in determining policy may 
involve less reliance on extra-record information than the more conventional opinion 
purporting to rest exclusively upon the record but which in reality is heavily dependent upon the 
assumption of unproved facts that are left vague and unidentified.”). 
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may assume that a particular belief is established “fact” even when 
there is no basis for that assumption. 
B. Lack of Rules and Regulations 
Recognizing the significance of legislative facts will only get 
courts so far in the absence of established procedures to guide them 
in resolving legislative fact disputes. In the absence of such rules, 
courts may simply make up the rules as they go along. Sometimes 
courts make assumptions based on background knowledge and 
understandings,249 and sometimes courts engage in their own research, 
scouring historical records and social science reports.250 Sometimes 
courts will look to another court’s resolution of the same or related 
factual questions, even if there is no reason to think that the other 
court was any better equipped to resolve the question.251 As discussed 
in Part II.B, courts will often turn to amicus briefs that make factual 
claims about the larger world. As the examples I discussed in the 
prior Parts suggest, such reliance on extra-record facts frequently 
happens in the most significant cases the courts confront. 
As an initial matter, this lack of established rules and regulations 
almost certainly creates inequities between litigants.252 Courts will 
choose whether or not to engage in additional research based on the 
topic of the case and the resource constraints facing the judge. 
Sometimes a court will give parties an opportunity to respond to its 
 
 249. See Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of 
Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (1987) (“[The] legal enshrinement [of 
legislative facts] is casual and unselfconscious, and their assessment often superficial and skewed 
by litigation imbalances.”). 
 250. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of 
Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2011) (“The majority of judges responded that 
they engage in additional research to compensate for . . . disparities [in legal representation] 
when they arise.”); see also Cochran, supra note 189, at 781 (“Because of the ease of finding 
nonlegal information on the Internet, both practitioners and judges are referring to more 
sociology, psychology, criminology, medical, and economics texts and journals and to more 
nonacademic books, magazines, and newspapers.”). For a good discussion of “independent 
judicial research,” see generally Cheng, supra note 189. Cheng argues that judges should be 
“encouraged” to engage in independent research and notes that the judiciary is “extremely 
divided” on the propriety of such activity: “roughly equal numbers of judges support[] 
independent research enthusiastically, denounc[e] it vehemently, and appear[] undecided.” Id. 
at 1266–67. 
 251. See, e.g., supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text. 
 252. See Thornburg, supra note 189, at 139 (“[D]ivergent views [regarding independent 
research] may indicate that the nation’s judiciary is also divergent in its practices—different 
litigants may be subject to differing treatment, often without even knowing it.”). Such inequities 
can in turn hurt the legitimacy of the courts, which are supposed to treat all litigants the same. 
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extra-record research, and sometimes it will not. There is no reason 
the courts’ treatment of legislative facts should vary across cases and 
litigants, but, in the absence of rules and guidelines governing the use 
of such facts, variance is inevitable. 
The absence of established rules and procedures also means that 
courts will often not find the legislative facts that they need to reach 
the proper result in a case. As one commentator has explained: 
In a world in which parties had unlimited and equal resources, 
relying on the parties to supply information relevant to a court’s 
lawmaking function would be safe. . . . Real courts do not operate in 
that ideal world, however, and the presentation of evidence can be 
skewed by inadequate party resources or incentives.253 
To be sure, courts can—and often will—search out the relevant facts 
themselves; yet even though courts may have the power to search out 
the relevant facts, there is little reason to think that they will always 
avail themselves of that power or be successful in doing so. 
Finally, even when courts do attempt to find the relevant 
legislative facts on their own, they do so without the benefit of 
processes that will help ensure that those facts are accurate and 
properly applied.254 As I noted at the outset, in a world of highly 
contestable facts, judges cannot easily discern factual reality simply by 
picking up a book. Yet virtually no attention has been paid to how 
courts find “facts” when those facts are legislative in nature. 
In theory, district courts are structured to allow for the taking of 
evidence and the resolution of factual conflicts.255 Justice Scalia has 
 
 253. Id. at 188; see also Posner & Yoon, supra note 250, at 320 (noting that federal judges 
perceive significant disparities in the quality of legal representation, particularly in the fields of 
“immigration and civil rights”). 
 254. See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 185, at 94–95 (“At trial, when statistical and 
social science evidence is employed, ‘it will be the subject of expert testimony and 
knowledgeable cross-examination from both sides.’ Amicus briefs are not subject to the same 
safeguards.” (quoting Wilkins v. Univ. of Hous., 654 F.2d 388, 403 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 459 
U.S. 809 (1982))); see also id. at 113 (“The Court routinely receives social science information in 
amicus as well as main briefs without subjecting it to quality control.”). 
 255. One can query, of course, whether district courts are structured to allow for the 
resolution of legislative facts, as opposed to adjudicative facts. Professor Davis, while 
recognizing that trial courts are better positioned to engage in such inquiries than appellate 
courts, see Davis, supra note 47, at 11 (“When legislative facts are needed for a sound decision, a 
trial court can do better than an appellate court, because it is free to take evidence on questions 
of legislative facts. Some trial courts do so, with desirable results.”), nonetheless recognizes that 
they are not especially well equipped to do so either, see id. (“[T]he normal evidence-taking 
process may be a total misfit for legislative facts. . . . As the law [regarding the Federal Rules of 
Evidence] was interpreted, the court was barred from considering precisely the kind of 
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pointed to this fact in arguing that factual development should occur 
before trial courts, and not in Supreme Court briefs: “An adversarial 
process in the trial courts can identify flaws in the methodology of the 
studies that the parties put forward; here, we accept the studies’ 
findings on faith, without examining their methodology at all.”256 In 
the context of adjudicative facts, this structure often entails 
competing witnesses and cross-examination. In the context of 
legislative facts, this structure often means not only competing 
witnesses and cross-examination, but also strict standards that govern 
whether the evidence is admissible.257  It is unclear why procedural 
safeguards are considered more necessary at the district court level 
than at the appellate court level. If anything, one might think the 
opposite would be true, especially when the comparison is between 
adjudicative facts at the district court level and legislative facts at the 
appellate court level. Legislative facts will often be more complicated 
than adjudicative facts, and the resolution of any legislative fact will 
 
information that was most helpful and most needed.”). But as some judges have noted, there are 
ways for trial courts to more creatively engage in the discovery of legislative facts. See, e.g., Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[A]s cases presenting 
significant science-related issues have increased in number, judges have increasingly found in 
the Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure ways to help them overcome the inherent difficulty 
of making determinations about complicated scientific, or otherwise technical, evidence. Among 
these techniques are an increased use of Rule 16’s pretrial conference authority to narrow the 
scientific issues in dispute, pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject to examination 
by the court, and the appointment of special masters and specially trained law clerks.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 256. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2286 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. 
(discussing various potential flaws in the data on which the majority relied and concluding that 
“[the Court’s] statistical analysis in [Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 
(2006),] cases is untested judicial factfinding masquerading as statutory interpretation”). 
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s pointed criticism of the majority in Sykes, he often cites amicus 
briefs and other extra-record materials to support factual claims in his own opinions. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736–41 (2011) (citing amicus briefs filed by the 
Cato Institute and the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund and a 1955 Harvard Law Review note). 
 257. Often the presentation of legislative facts will require the testimony of experts with 
specialized knowledge in the field; the admission of such expert testimony is governed by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as by case law. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case.”); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993) 
(establishing the standard for assessing the admissibility of novel scientific evidence); see also 
Lewis A. Kaplan, Experts in the Courthouse: Problems and Opportunities, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 247, 254 (“Even where we have full cross-examination of competing expert witnesses, we 
are not always as capable as we would like to be in reaching reliable, reasoned decisions.”). 
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have a much more significant impact on society as a whole. Moreover, 
in the vast majority of cases, the appellate court’s word on the subject 
will be the final one, given the limited scope of Supreme Court 
review.258 
Some have argued that traditional adversarial testing may be less 
valuable when legislative facts—as opposed to adjudicative facts—are 
at issue,259 but even if that argument is right, it does not follow that 
there should be no testing of legislative facts at all,260 as is often the 
case when they come to the Court’s attention through amicus briefs. 
To be sure, there will sometimes be competing claims in amicus 
briefs, but that will not always be the case. Moreover, as previously 
noted, page limitations make briefs an awkward mechanism for 
addressing factual claims and expert testimony. After all, as much 
space as it may take to explain a factual claim based on empirical 
evidence, it will likely take even more to explain why that claim is 
wrong and offer an alternative understanding.261 Thus, amicus practice 
presents, at best, a limited and ad hoc opportunity for the 
 
 258. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1100 (1987) (“[T]he Justices have only 150 full opportunities yearly to carry out their 
function. No one suggests this number could be increased very much. Given the steady, if not 
explosive, growth of the Court’s potential docket, each of these 150 cases represents an 
increasingly precious opportunity for the Court to perform its supervisory task.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 259. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 189, at 1281 (“In the scientific evidence 
context . . . . adversarialism may be ineffective or even counterproductive . . . .”); see also, e.g., 
Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Trial procedure is best suited for 
adjudicative facts because the best source of information about specific facts concerning the 
individual parties is the parties themselves. Facts that concern scientific truths, sociological data, 
and industry-wide practices, on the other hand, are not peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
parties and are not of the type that generally would be aided by viewing the demeanor of 
witnesses, by cross-examination, and other aspects of adversarial factual development.”), 
vacated, 461 U.S. 952 (1983). 
 260. Professor Michael Saks seems to take the view that special procedures for the 
examination of legislative facts are unnecessary because, even if courts’ treatment of legislative 
facts is sometimes sloppy, the same is true of courts’ treatment of cases and statutes. See 
Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1023–24 
(1990) (“[The] complaint that courts are careless about the social inquiries they make is of a 
different order than whether they should conduct such inquiries. . . . [This] complaint is no 
different from a complaint that a court has indulged in a casual or careless reading of cases or 
statutes.”). But this argument ignores the fact that judges are trained in the reading of cases and 
statutes, even if they may often do so imperfectly. Judges have no special training for the type of 
research that goes into determining legislative facts. 
 261. In any event, whatever discussion of factual claims might occur in amicus briefs, none 
of those claims are subjected to the same sort of vigorous adversarial testing that ideally occurs 
in the district court. 
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presentation of adversarial ideas, not the structured opportunity for 
give-and-take presented by the party-centered adversarial system. 
The paradoxical result of the courts’ inattention to this tension is that 
those facts that are most in need of meaningful testing are often least 
likely to receive it.262 This lack of proper testing can affect not only the 
quality of a court’s decision in any given case, but also the courts’ 
overall legitimacy.263 
C. Transparency 
In the two preceding Sections, I have discussed how the courts’ 
inattention to the difference between legislative and adjudicative facts 
can affect the courts’ decisionmaking. But that inattention affects not 
only how courts make decisions, but also how they present their 
decisions to the public and to other governmental actors. As a general 
matter, the judicial process is often shrouded in mystery—a veritable 
black box.264 The general public’s window into the process by which 
courts resolve judicial disputes is often quite narrow.265 To be sure, 
briefs are publicly available, and oral arguments sometimes are. But 
deliberations are conducted outside public view,266 meaning that the 
public often has little understanding of why a court made the decision 
it did. This secrecy can give rise to a lack of understanding and to a 
 
 262. See Davis, supra note 183, at 940 (“When only the immediate parties are affected, 
allocating the burden of producing legislative facts and holding against a party who fails to 
sustain his burden is both customary and sound. But when the Court is making law that affects 
the many, and especially when it holds legislation unconstitutional, nothing less than adequate 
factual development can be acceptable.”). 
 263. Margolis, supra note 221, at 209 (“Consistent misuse of non-legal information can serve 
to undermine a court’s legitimacy, the court may appear irrational, and its decisions may be 
considered unpersuasive.”). 
 264. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 976 (1987) (“[T]o a large extent, the [Court’s Fourth Amendment] balancing takes 
place inside a black box. Of course, the hidden process raises the specter of the kind of judicial 
decisionmaking that the Realists warned us about and that balancing promised to overcome.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 265. See, e.g., F. Dennis Hale, Court Decisions as Information Sources for Journalists: How 
Journalists Can Better Cover Appellate Decisions, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 111, 111–12 
(2000) (discussing the difficulties of reporting on appellate courts and the importance of the 
published opinion). 
 266. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 
47–48 (2004) (“Apart from the final opinion or the publication of briefs, oral argument is the 
only public proceeding in the appellate process.”). 
GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/6/2011  6:57:08 PM 
62 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1 
lack of faith that judges’ decisions are motivated by proper 
considerations.267 
The only meaningful counter to this secrecy is the judicial 
opinion. As old as the courts themselves, judicial opinions are 
supposed to be transparent in both their conclusions and their 
reasoning. By explaining courts’ decisions to the public, they facilitate 
public knowledge and public understanding of those decisions.268 As 
two commentators note, “[P]ublishing an opinion can help ameliorate 
legitimacy concerns. The opinion allows the judges to explain their 
reasoning.”269 Moreover, the judicial opinion can “advance[] the goal 
of judicial constraint . . . by limiting idiosyncratic or ideological 
decisionmaking.”270 In the absence of the explanation judicial opinions 
provide, judicial decisions, particularly controversial ones, might find 
less acceptance by the public.271 Judicial opinions also enable other 
governmental actors, such as Congress, to respond more effectively to 
the Court’s decisions.272 But the courts’ failure to acknowledge that 
 
 267. This concern is not trivial because “public acceptance [of the Court’s decisions] is not 
automatic and cannot be taken for granted.” STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY 
WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW, at xiii (2010). 
 268. See Ryan Benjamin Witte, The Judge as Author/The Author as Judge, 40 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 37, 40 (2009) (“The last audience of judicial opinions is the general public. 
Although the general populace rarely reads more of court opinions than the quotes they gather 
from the newspaper, it is nonetheless important that judges keep the layperson in mind when 
crafting their opinions.”); cf. Carl A. Auerbach, Essay, A Revival of Some Ancient Learning: A 
Critique of Eisenberg’s The Nature of the Common Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 539, 557 (1991) 
(“Judicial decisions and opinions may educate the legislature and public and alter prevailing 
notions of morality and policy.”). 
 269. Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 98, at 993–94. 
 270. Id. at 994; see also Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447–48 (1995) (discussing how the writing of judicial opinions can 
discipline thinking and make apparent the “[i]narticulable or even unconscious feelings and 
impressions” that may be underlying a judge’s conclusions); Meighan A. Rowe, Protecting 
Those Who Protect Others: The Implications of the State Bar Act on Attorneys’ Adjudication 
Rights in Disciplinary Proceedings, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 137, 153 (2002) (“It is this facet 
of the written opinion, imposing a judicial standard of fairness by opening opinions for the 
world to see, that is another fundamental brick in the wall of procedural due process . . . .”); 
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (“A 
requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions—grounds of decision that can be 
debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise 
of power.”). 
 271. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or 
Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 768 (1983) (“[T]he courts’ opinions should 
contain reasoned explanations of their decisions to lend them legitimacy, permit public 
evaluation, and impose a discipline on judges.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of 
Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 165, 178–81 
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legislative decisions are informing their consideration of issues—and 
their resolution of those issues—means that judicial opinions are not 
actually giving an honest account of judges’ decisions. 
Instead of acknowledging that their decisions are based on 
factual premises, courts will instead subsume factual understandings 
in statements about values. Because courts often obfuscate—
intentionally or not—what is really motivating their decisions, it is 
difficult for both the public and other actors to understand a given 
decision and respond to it. After all, if potential litigants and other 
governmental actors do not understand that the courts’ decisions are 
predicated on empirical understandings, they have no opportunity to 
challenge such understandings in future litigation or in other 
responses to the courts’ decisions. And if the true bases for a decision 
are unclear, the public’s ability to meaningfully evaluate and debate 
that decision will be impaired.273 Moreover, as I discuss in the next 
Section, it may mean that determinations that are essentially 
empirical—facts that can and should be revisited over time—become 
embedded in the law as immutable statements of reality. 
D. Factual Stare Decisis 
Courts explain the reasoning underlying their decisions in 
judicial opinions not only to inform the public, but also to inform 
each other. Appellate courts are aided in reviewing lower court 
decisions by the lower court’s explanation of why it reached the 
decision that it did.274 And lower courts are aided in resolving new 
 
(1999) (providing an empirical analysis of the Supreme Court decisions that invite Congress to 
overturn the Court on questions of federal statutory interpretation); see also ROBERT A. 
KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 73 (1997) (noting that federal appellate judges sometimes 
seek to bring issues to the attention of Congress); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting 
Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (identifying an entire genre of dissents that were 
intended “to attract immediate public attention and, thereby, to propel legislative change”). 
 273. Cf. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 962 
(2004) (“The Constitution of the United States originated within a system of ‘popular 
constitutionalism.’ In this system, government officials were required to do their best to 
interpret the Constitution while going about the daily business of governing, but their 
interpretations were not authoritative and were instead subject to direct supervision and 
correction by the superior authority of ‘the people themselves’ . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 274. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim 
Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 
818–19 (2010) (“[A district court resolving patent claims] should provide a detailed explanation 
for the basis for its ruling. Although the Federal Circuit currently reviews claim construction 
rulings de novo, it is more likely to defer to the trial court’s interpretation when the ruling is 
detailed and is accompanied by a detailed record.”); Anne Louise Marshall, Note, How Do 
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questions of law by the guidance higher courts have provided in the 
course of resolving similar questions.275 Indeed, as a general matter, 
lower courts are bound by higher court decisions when those 
decisions’ holdings address the precise legal question before the lower 
court.276 What is less clear is the extent to which lower courts are—or 
should be—bound by higher courts’ factual findings. This question 
has been, as previously noted, a source of significant dispute amongst 
courts of appeals following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Carhart.277 
Whatever the law might require, lower courts will, as a practical 
matter, often reflexively follow a statement by a higher court, even if 
the statement is only dictum or a factual finding that perhaps ought 
not be binding. As Professor Davis notes, 
The reality seems to be that courts often go beyond the record for 
disputable facts, and . . . one of the principal sources of such extra-
record facts is factual propositions of law that have been laid down 
in earlier cases . . . . Whatever the theory about stare decisis may be, 
the tendency of the courts to apply that principle to findings of fact 
is a rather substantial one.278 
 
Federal Courts of Appeals Apply Booker Reasonableness Review After Gall?, 45 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1419, 1432 (2008) (“The most important part of the record for the appellate judges to 
review is the district court’s explanation of why a sentence was imposed . . . .”). 
 275. See, e.g., Thomas Grey, Holmes’s Language of Judging—Some Philistine Remarks, 70 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 5, 6 (1996) (“[T]he immediate practical point of accompanying appellate 
judgments with opinions is to provide guidance to lower court judges and to lawyers counseling 
clients”); Nancy A. Wanderer, Writing Better Opinions: Communicating with Candor, Clarity, 
and Style, 54 ME. L. REV. 47, 53 (2002) (“Others have noted that appellate judges must address 
opinions to both lower and higher courts, ‘lawyers seeking understanding and guidance,’ other 
members of the judicial panel, ‘judges in other jurisdictions, legislative and executive officials, 
scholars, and the community at large,’ any of whom might plan future transactions based on the 
courts’ opinions.” (quoting Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 81, 87 (1994))). 
 276. Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 
128 (1997) (noting that, because of “[p]rinciples of stare decisis,” once a “question is decided in 
an appellate court, . . . lower courts are then responsible for following that decision”). 
 277. See supra notes 209–215 and accompanying text. 
 278. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 970; see also Keeton, supra note 163, at 26 
(“[A legislative fact] decision has force analogous to that of the decision of law for which it 
served as a [legislative] fact . . . . [I]t is not subject to challenge except as part of the challenge to 
the precedent for which it served as a premise. A contention that its factual premises are false 
cannot evade the precedent. Rather, one may assert the falsity of the premises in support of the 
contention that a court should overrule the precedent.”). 
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Indeed, in the aftermath of Citizens United, numerous courts have 
treated as gospel the Court’s factual claim that independent 
expenditures do not result in corruption.279 
Even under ideal circumstances, there would be something 
troubling about the perpetuation of court decisions based on factual 
findings that have outlived their time and merit reexamination.280 It is 
particularly troubling when one remembers that the original factual 
findings may have been based on virtually no evidence at all and 
whether they were based on evidence may have been due in large 
part to chance—that is, whether the particular parties that brought 
the first case raising those factual issues litigated the case well. To be 
sure, Supreme Court rulings can be overruled, but overruling occurs 
only in limited circumstances.281 It is unclear why factual findings 
should be held to such a high standard. It may be beneficial for legal 
precedents to enjoy a certain stability, but it is unclear why factual 
findings should be equally stable when the world they are describing 
may not be, and when new research inevitably provides a better and 
more precise understanding of the world.282 Moreover, this 
 
 279. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (“In light 
of the Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create 
the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to groups that make only independent 
expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption. The Court has 
effectively held that there is no corrupting ‘quid’ for which a candidate might in exchange offer 
a corrupt ‘quo.’”), cert. denied sub nom. Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010); see also Long 
Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Supreme Court precedent forecloses the City’s argument that independent expenditures by 
independent expenditure committees (‘IECs’), like the Chamber PACs, raise the specter of 
corruption or the appearance thereof.”); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 
158 (D.D.C.) (“To the extent the FEC argues that large contributions to the national parties are 
corrupting and can be limited because they create gratitude, facilitate access, or generate 
influence, Citizens United makes clear that those theories are not viable.”), aff’d mem., 130 S. 
Ct. 3544 (2010). But see Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 695 (“[T]he City’s broadly based anti-
corruption rationale for restricting contributions to IECs is lacking in legal and factual support 
because the City has not offered sufficient evidence of corruption to support its asserted 
governmental interest in restricting contributions to IECs.”). 
 280. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (noting that it 
may be appropriate to overrule an earlier precedent when “facts have so changed, or come to be 
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”). 
 281. See id. at 854–55 (discussing the circumstances under which a Supreme Court decision 
may be overruled). 
 282. See, e.g., id. at 860 (“We have seen how time has overtaken some of Roe’s factual 
assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions safe to the mother later in 
pregnancy than was true in 1973, and advances in neonatal care have advanced viability to a 
point somewhat earlier.” (citation omitted)). Even commentators who have argued that trial 
courts should treat social science research the same way they treat case precedent, e.g., John 
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social 
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entrenchment can pose real problems for subsequent litigants 
bringing a claim that turns on the same facts. Such litigants end up 
virtually bound by the prior court’s factual findings, even though they 
had no opportunity to present evidence regarding those findings. At a 
minimum, whatever the appropriate precedential effect of legislative 
factfindings may be, it should be the result of a considered decision. It 
should not become a matter of course simply as a result of an 
unreflective conflation of facts and law. 
E. More Fundamental Questions 
Most fundamentally, the fact that there has been so little 
attention paid to the distinction between adjudicative and legislative 
facts raises the question whether the U.S. legal system, which is 
primarily designed to address adjudicative facts, should be modified 
to take more explicit account of the existence of legislative facts and 
the critical role that they play in establishing the nation’s legal rules. 
It also raises the question whether the U.S. legal system should 
continue to view itself as focused almost entirely on narrow 
adversarial disputes when some of the most consequential cases the 
courts resolve are not conflicts between two opposing parties, but 
between two opposing ideas about the law or public policy.283 
Consider the litigation challenging the constitutionality of the 
healthcare-reform legislation. By early 2011, at least thirteen suits had 
been filed in nearly as many districts.284 The plaintiffs in these suits are 
not prototypical plaintiffs who have suffered some particularized or 
personal injury; indeed, some are state attorneys general.285 And the 
courts considering these challenges are hearing virtually no facts that 
 
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478 (1986), have acknowledged that “a lower court 
should be able to reach empirical conclusions that differ from those of an appellate court when 
it has obtained new research not previously before the reviewing court,” id. at 516. Of course, it 
is unclear how exactly this would work. Courts adopting legislative facts rarely go into depth 
about all of the sources that they have considered in adopting that position, so it is unclear how 
lower courts would know when they have considered new research that was not previously 
reviewed by the appellate court. 
 283. Cf. Davis, supra note 47, at 6 (“Legislators have no problem about considering the way 
a policy may affect a nonparty; judges usually focus mainly on parties, even when a decision may 
vitally affect nonparties.”). 
 284. For a good overview of the current status of the various suits challenging the healthcare 
reform legislation, see ACA LITIG. BLOG, http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com (last updated 
Sept. 2, 2011, 5:12 PM). 
 285. E.g., Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-
11021 & 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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are unique to the particular parties before them; instead, they are all 
considering essentially the same legislative fact questions about the 
effect of uninsured persons on the healthcare market and the effect of 
the healthcare market on the larger economy.286 There is arguably 
something odd about different judges in different parts of the country 
all considering the same factual questions—and reaching different 
answers. To be sure, judges often reach different answers to the same 
questions, but generally those questions are legal rather than factual. 
There is a considerable difference, and even some oddity, in courts’ 
efforts to answer these factual questions—key questions on which the 
constitutionality of this important legislation will inevitably turn—
without as many resources as possible. 
I do not mean to suggest that there is necessarily anything wrong 
with courts hearing these cases, although whether the plaintiffs have 
standing under traditional standing doctrine is a close question at 
best.287 But even if it is desirable for courts to hear these cases, it does 
not follow that this is the ideal way for the courts to hear them. The 
procedures these courts are using would make sense if the courts 
were resolving cases that turned primarily on adjudicative facts. The 
question is simply whether they make as much sense when the cases 
turn on legislative facts. 
Perhaps the parties in these cases will be able to present the 
courts with all of the information that they need, but there are 
certainly many other interested organizations and individuals that will 
be just as affected by the courts’ decisions and that will have just as 
much access, if not more, to the relevant facts. When these cases go 
up on appeal, those groups may offer the appellate courts their own 
factual claims. But at that point, those claims will be subject to little, if 
any, adversarial testing, in part because the U.S. legal system—so sure 
that factual development is confined to parties before the trial 
 
 286. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *12 (6th 
Cir. June 29, 2011) (“Congress had a rational basis to believe that the practice of self-insuring 
for the cost of health care, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.”); see also 
Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *61 (concluding that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause); Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 775–82 (finding that the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision exceeds the scope of Congress’s historical Commerce 
Clause power and therefore cannot be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 287. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Federal Jurisdiction in Support of 
Appellant, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2011) (arguing 
that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing); cf. Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slew the 
Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that the district court in Sebelius lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to declare the healthcare reform unconstitutional). 
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court—has developed no methods for testing facts that do not enter 
the case in that way. They will, in other words, have fallen victim to 
the adversarial myth. 
The adversarial myth suggests that all of the factual disputes 
being resolved in the nation’s courts are being subject to rigorous 
adversarial testing, and that suitable procedures are in place to deal 
with all of the cases in the nation’s court system, those that turn on 
adjudicative and legislative facts alike. But the myth is maintained 
only by ignoring the extent to which courts regularly disregard those 
practices and procedures. This tension between the myth and the 
reality teaches an important lesson: if courts are not content to rely 
on traditional adversarialism, there is likely a reason. Court practices 
and procedures may need to be modified to ensure that all facts, not 
just adjudicative ones, are rigorously tested before they become the 
basis for legally binding rules. In the next Part, I offer some 
preliminary thoughts on how to address this problem. 
V.  SOME THOUGHTS ON MOVING FORWARD 
Having recognized the existence of the adversarial myth—and 
the numerous consequences that follow from it—the question 
remains how best to address those consequences. I offer some 
preliminary thoughts on larger solutions—ideas to restructure the 
nation’s legal system to take account of the reality that not all facts 
are created equal, and that the current system is designed to resolve 
disputes that turn on adjudicative facts, not legislative facts. But 
recognizing that such large-scale changes may not be imminent, I also 
offer some thoughts on steps judges can take in the meantime to 
address the problems created by the tension between the adversarial 
myth and the legal system’s quasi-adversarial reality. In the end, all of 
the solutions I suggest rest on recognizing the difference between 
adjudicative and legislative facts, which, in turn, helps identify both 
where the nation’s adversarial system is more myth than reality and 
how to address the problem. 
A. Larger Solutions 
As I discussed in the preceding Parts, the U.S. legal system has 
long struggled—albeit quietly—with its multiplicity of roles. The 
system has at once resolved narrow disputes that will affect only the 
parties before the court and more general disputes that will have far 
more significant consequences for society as a whole. The U.S. legal 
GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/6/2011  6:57:08 PM 
2011] THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH 69 
system was designed to address the former, and is not necessarily well 
suited to addressing the latter. It is perhaps worth considering, then, 
whether the myth that the current system is ensuring adequate testing 
of all of the disputes that come before the courts should be 
abandoned and replaced with an alternative model that employs 
different practices and procedures when legislative facts are at issue. 
As an initial matter, the courts’ liberal acceptance and use of 
extra-record facts is an implicit recognition that adverseness is not 
sufficient to ensure that courts are provided with all of the facts they 
need to resolve cases. This, then, calls into question one of the 
primary assumptions on which standing doctrine is premised—the 
notion that adverseness will sharpen the presentation of issues to the 
court and thereby improve judicial decisionmaking. Indeed, as one 
commentator has argued, if “the concrete-adversity test is meant to 
guarantee . . . the best advocacy . . . standing doctrine does not 
provide that guarantee.”288 Others have also questioned the 
assumption that standing doctrine ensures higher-quality advocacy. 
Given that the plaintiff with the injury will not actually be the person 
arguing the case, there is reason to question whether the 
particularized nature of his injury will actually affect the quality of the 
advocacy.289 Moreover, “the willingness of a plaintiff voluntarily to 
undergo the expense and inconvenience of litigation should itself 
provide adequate assurance of vigorous advocacy.”290 Indeed, there is 
reason to think that “the quality of advocacy in public actions, where 
interest groups competently assert their own special interests, is 
higher than the quality of advocacy in the average private suit, in 
which the plaintiff satisfies traditional requirements of particularized 
injury.”291 
This discussion suggests that courts should be more open to 
hearing disputes even when the plaintiff does not have the 
particularized injury that is the sine qua non of contemporary 
standing doctrine. After all, although there may be multiple 
justifications for standing doctrine,292 the need for adverse 
 
 288. Elliott, supra note 64, at 474. 
 289. Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 650–51 (1983); cf. 
Healy, supra note 45, at 914 (“[E]ven supporters of public interest litigation do not question the 
need for an adversarial presentation of the issues. They question only the Court’s insistence that 
the presentation be made by parties with a personal stake in the dispute.” (footnote omitted)). 
 290. Spann, supra note 289, at 650. 
 291. Id. at 651. 
 292. See supra notes 64–78 and accompanying text. 
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presentation of the issues by the parties is frequently invoked.293 If 
attention to the practice of appellate courts reveals that standing 
doctrine is unable to fulfill—and arguably undermines—one of its 
primary responsibilities, other traditional justifications for standing 
doctrine must be examined to determine whether they also fall away 
under scrutiny. Litigants and cases should not be denied entry into 
the court system based on a doctrine that does not actually serve the 
purposes it was designed to serve. 
Moreover, allowing those actors who do not satisfy standing 
doctrine’s traditional injury requirement to become parties may help 
ensure better development of the factual record before the trial court. 
To be sure, nonparties can, and often do, introduce factual evidence 
through amicus briefs, but as I have previously discussed, such factual 
evidence is generally introduced in the appellate courts in a way that 
allows it to escape the rigors of adversarial testing. It would be far 
better to bring those organizations and individuals with relevant facts 
into the process at the trial court stage, when the information they 
have to offer can be subjected to some form of scrutiny and testing. In 
that way, the trial court can have a meaningful opportunity to be the 
first real factfinder—as it is supposed to be—and the appellate court 
can look to the record the trial court developed for all of the facts that 
are relevant to the case. 
To be sure, the requirement of standing is now very much 
entrenched in the law, and the Court has offered justifications for it 
beyond the need for adversity.294 But it is worth remembering that 
standing is, in the view of many, a court-conceived doctrine. 
According to one commentator, the “constitutional bar to strangers 
as complainants against unconstitutional action . . . [is] without 
foundation” and exists, at least in part, because of “the mistaken 
assumption that the practice in such strictly private actions as tort and 
contract governed ‘public actions’ as well.”295 As I have argued 
 
 293. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 295. Berger, supra note 52, at 827; see also Winter, supra note 52, at 1374 (“[A] painstaking 
search of the historical material demonstrates that—for the first 150 years of the Republic—the 
Framers, the first Congresses, and the Court were oblivious to the modern conception either 
that standing is a component of the constitutional phrase ‘cases or controversies’ or that it is a 
prerequisite for seeking governmental compliance with the law.”); cf. Elizabeth Magill, Standing 
for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1139 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court used to “embrace[] a different approach to standing,” one that “allowed Congress to 
authorize challenges to administrative action by those who did not have legal rights” so they 
could “raise the rights of the public”). 
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throughout, appellate courts’ failure to truly come to terms with the 
duality of their roles has meant that rules and practices designed for 
one type of case—private disputes involving adjudicative facts—have 
been awkwardly applied to a fundamentally different type of case—
public disputes involving legislative facts.296 
Moreover, if the need for adversity is not doing any meaningful 
work in the Court’s standing analysis, it would be better if the Court 
stopped pretending otherwise. The Court’s frequent invocation of 
adversity as a justification for standing limitations helps obscure the 
fact that the courts often do not rely on adverse parties for factual 
development. As I discussed in the prior Part, the courts’ failure to 
recognize their reliance on extra-record factfinding is in many 
respects even more problematic than the fact that it occurs. Once the 
appellate courts’ practice of looking beyond the parties for factual 
development is acknowledged, procedures can be developed to 
ensure that those extra-record facts are meaningfully tested. Indeed, 
although the courts’ frequent resort to extra-record factfinding raises 
one reason to rethink traditional standing limitations, bringing more 
parties into the process earlier does not necessarily require 
liberalizing standing requirements; an alternative—and easier—initial 
step might be to liberalize the rules for intervention in cases in which 
traditional standing has been established by defining broadly who has 
an “interest” in litigation.297 
In addition to opening the door to more parties, the courts could 
also play a more active role in determining which counsel will bear 
primary responsibility for litigating a case. Such an active role for the 
courts would not be wholly foreign even in the United States’ 
adversarial system. In class actions, for example, courts have the 
 
 296. Cf. Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing To Be Done: An Essay on 
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts To Enforce the Law, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 281 (2003) (“[T]he private law model . . . dominated the world of 
Marbury v. Madison; a model that made sense then, but does not fairly represent the world we 
inhabit today.”). 
 297. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (rule for intervention); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a 
Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 251 (1990) (noting “the range of interests which have been required 
for intervention” under Rule 24); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 312, 418 & n.372 (1997) (“Joinder and intervention should be liberally 
permitted.”); Juliet Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking In: Must Intervenors 
Demonstrate Standing To Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455, 455–56 (2002) (“By allowing 
nonparties to intervene, Rule 24 lets them represent their interests and arguably improves the 
court’s decisionmaking by allowing the presentation of different viewpoints and evidence. 
Courts may also benefit from granting motions to intervene, because by including intervenors 
up front, they may be spared relitigation of the same issue.” (footnote omitted)). 
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authority to appoint “class counsel” and are supposed to consider, 
among other things, the potential counsel’s resources and experience, 
as well as “any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class.”298 And the Supreme 
Court regularly appoints counsel to “support an undefended 
judgment below, or to take a specific position as an amicus.”299 
Courts should also consider what procedures are most 
appropriate for resolution of disputes about legislative facts.300 Courts 
and commentators alike have, at various times, suggested that 
adversarial, trial-type hearings are not the best method for resolving 
such disputes.301 That may well be right. My point in this Article is not 
that adversarialism necessarily provides the best means of testing all 
facts,302 but simply that the assumption that all of the factual findings 
in appellate court opinions are currently being subjected to such 
testing is a myth. And it is therefore necessary to think about what 
processes should be put in place to ensure that factual findings are, in 
fact, subjected to meaningful testing, whether adversarial or not. 
Perhaps courts should turn to experts to help with the adjudication of 
legislative facts,303 or perhaps there should be panels of judges who 
specialize in the resolution of this particular type of factual dispute.304 
 
 298. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
 299. Goldman, supra note 3, at 907 (noting that this has happened forty-three times since 
1954). 
 300. To be sure, it may be difficult to determine which facts need to be subjected to this 
more rigorous testing. After all, there are any number of facts implicit in any judicial decision, 
and it cannot be that all of them are susceptible to formal proof. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory 
committee’s note (“[E]very case involves the use of hundreds or thousands of nonevidence 
facts. . . . The judicial process cannot construct every case from scratch, like Descartes creating a 
world based on the postulate Cogito, ergo sum.”); see also Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2267, 2291 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that an “intuition . . . consistent with 
common sense and experience,” “even though unsupported by data,” could “be sufficient” to 
justify the Court’s conclusion on an empirical question); Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, 
at 975 (“Every simple case involves the assumption of hundreds of facts that have not been 
proved.”). How to distinguish those facts that require meaningful testing from those that do not 
is a subject I hope to take up in a future Article. 
 301. See, e.g., supra note 198. 
 302. Even if adversarialism is not always the best means of testing factual findings, it is 
important to consider whether due process concerns require providing some notice to parties 
before legislative fact disputes are resolved through nonadversarial means. See Thornburg, 
supra note 189, at 192–96 (discussing the due process concerns posed when judges engage in 
factfinding by conducting their own independent research). 
 303. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“The court may on its own motion or on the motion of 
any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may 
request the parties to submit nominations.”). 
 304. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72–73 (establishing the rules applicable to magistrate judges). 
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Perhaps there should be guidelines for a more active research process 
on the part of judges.305 Perhaps there should be officials who 
specialize in legislative factfinding to whom appellate judges can turn 
for assistance, just as district court judges often turn to magistrates.306 
At least one commentator suggests that there should be a research 
service for the Supreme Court to assist the Court in this regard. 
Professor Davis proposes that the Court 
formally ask Congress to explore the potential for creating a 
research service to assist the Court. The sole purpose should be to 
increase the Court’s freedom to obtain whatever research assistance 
it decides it needs. The Court should have the privilege of asking for 
research either on a problem about a pending case or about a 
narrow or broad area of law.307 
Whatever the best procedures or guidelines might be,308 some 
procedures or guidelines should exist so that judges—be they trial or 
appellate—do not simply engage in the ad hoc cherry-picking of facts 
out of amicus briefs, their bedtime reading, or their nightly news 
program, and so that all litigants—parties and nonparties alike—
 
 305. Even if such an active role for the judge might be inconsistent with traditional norms of 
a judge’s role in an adversarial system, it would not be unprecedented for the judicial system to 
“violate[] its own ideals of passivity and party control in the name of better decisionmaking.” 
Cheng, supra note 189, at 1283; see also Goldman, supra note 3, at 971 (noting that the Court’s 
“commit[ment] . . . to the goal of judicial restraint that the adversary system promotes” is “weak 
when the Court is presented with a vehicle to address a question of great interest”). 
 306. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate 
over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1699 (2005) (asking whether “the 
burdens on appellate courts [have] reached the point where Congress should consider the 
creation of a permanent corps of professional assistants to Article III court of appeals judges” 
and noting that “[s]uch assistants could fill a role modeled on that of the magistrate judge in 
district court litigation”). 
 307. Davis, supra note 47, at 17. Of course, the Supreme Court currently has at its disposal 
the assistance of the excellent research staff of the Supreme Court library. See, e.g., Philip P. 
Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian Law, 
38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 665 (2006) (“When I was a clerk, in 1979–80, our best research tools were 
the excellent research librarians of the Supreme Court library. If asked by my justice, Thurgood 
Marshall, to find out all I could about tribal courts—a subject about which I knew nothing—I 
would have turned over the inquiry to one of them. In a few days, I would have received 
whatever she or he could locate in the Supreme Court library, the Library of Congress, and 
wherever else materials could be found.”). The goal of a research service would be to make such 
assistance more formalized and more transparent. 
 308. See Margolis, supra note 221, at 205 (summarizing briefly past proposals to address the 
problem). It may well also be that different procedures or rules should apply depending on the 
type of legislative fact or the use to which it will be put in the court’s analysis. Id. at 215. 
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know what sorts of information they can submit to the court and at 
what stage.309 
Finally, if courts should employ special procedures to resolve 
disputes involving legislative facts, it is worth considering whether all 
cases that turn primarily on the same legislative facts should be 
consolidated in one court, rather than adjudicated in many different 
district courts across the country.310 It will not always be easy, of 
course, to readily identify those cases in which legislative facts are 
dispositive. But in many cases it will be easy to make that 
determination, either because no adjudicative facts are relevant or 
because the parties can stipulate to any relevant adjudicative facts. Or 
it might be possible to bifurcate cases—with traditional district courts 
resolving the adjudicative facts—before the cases are consolidated in 
a single court that will resolve any legislative fact disputes. This sort 
of consolidation would not only facilitate the concentration of 
investigative resources, but would also avoid the awkwardness of 
different courts resolving factual disputes in different ways.311 It could 
also, although it need not, facilitate some degree of judicial 
specialization, allowing judges with expertise in particular areas to 
hear cases in the relevant fields.312  The possibility of courts engaging 
 
 309. Id. at 200 (arguing that “lawyers [have not made] effective use of non-legal materials in 
support of policy arguments in briefs” because, in part, “many attorneys believed they could not 
put factual information in their briefs if it had not been placed in evidence at trial”). 
 310. There is, in fact, already a statute that provides for the consolidation or coordination of 
pretrial proceedings when “civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are 
pending in different districts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 42 (rule for 
consolidation). This multidistrict litigation statute may have lessons to teach about how courts 
could bifurcate cases to help address legislative facts. For more on consolidation in the federal 
courts, see generally Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 879; and Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 918 (1995). 
 311. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is unsound to say that, on records very similar in nature, [one state’s] law 
could be valid . . . and [another’s] invalid, just because different district judges reached different 
conclusions about the inferences to be drawn from the same body of statistical work.”); Hope 
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 883 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), vacated, 530 
U.S. 1271 (2000) (“[T]he constitutional right of abortion cannot be made to depend on whether 
a particular district judge finds a particular physician who disagrees with the consensus of 
medical opinion to be more credible than the spokesmen for the consensus.”). But see Saks, 
supra note 260, at 1013 (“Discovering that various courts make findings or announce holdings in 
contradictory directions is only to discover . . . what the early legal realists discovered about 
contracts, torts, and every other area of law.”). 
 312. The prospect of specialized courts has, of course, long been the subject of controversy. 
See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 520–21 
(2008) (“Federal circuit judges, for example, frequently comment on the importance and 
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in the type of factual development typically undertaken by 
legislatures may give a reader some pause. But to the extent that 
engaging in that type of factual development is a fundamental part of 
the enterprise of judging, it is better that it be done in the open. 
I do not mean to suggest that specialized courts of this nature are 
necessarily the right solution. Indeed, there would surely be 
downsides to such an approach. All I mean to do at this point is to 
identify the tensions in the existing system and to begin a 
conversation about the problems caused by those tensions, as well as 
possible solutions. If there is a big problem, it makes sense to think 
big about ways to address it. 
B. In the Meantime . . . What Judges Can Do 
That said, it takes time to implement big solutions. In the 
meantime, there are smaller and simpler steps that appellate judges 
can take when they are confronted with an inadequate factual record 
from the trial court below. First, one simple but significant step would 
be for appellate courts to remand the case to the trial court.313 Trial 
courts may not be the perfect forums for resolving legislative fact 
disputes, but at present they are the only judicial bodies with formal 
experience making factual findings. Trial courts can hold hearings 
specifically on a legislative fact question with witnesses able to speak 
to the issue. Trial courts can encourage back-and-forth between 
 
desirability of being a generalist and acknowledge the generalist’s iconic status in the American 
legal tradition.” (footnote omitted)); S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the 
Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a 
Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 866–67 (1990) (proposing a study of the Federal Circuit to help 
assess the effects of specialized courts); Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the 
Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2005) 
(proposing an “alternative path to judicial specialization” modeled on the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany). 
 313. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) (“Because of the 
unresolved factual questions, the importance of the issues . . . , and the conflicting conclusions 
that the parties contend are to be drawn from the statistics and other evidence presented, we 
think it necessary to permit the parties to develop a more thorough factual record, and to allow 
the District Court to resolve any factual disputes remaining, before passing upon the 
constitutional validity of the challenged provisions.”); see also Alfange, supra note 165, at 668 
(“Where an adequate trial of the facts is not held, however, and the appellate courts find it 
necessary to be more fully informed on factual questions, a remand to the lower court for a 
more thorough trial would be entirely in order.”); Miller & Barron, supra note 41, at 1233–36 
(suggesting that the Supreme Court should sometimes “remand the issue of the taking of 
judicial notice of a particular issue of legislative fact to the trial court”). 
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parties and direct them to respond to specific claims and arguments.314 
And a trial court facing a remand from an appellate court to address a 
legislative fact question can encourage amicus participation and make 
sure that the opposing parties—and opposing amici—have ample 
opportunity to respond to each other’s factual claims.315 By adopting 
these practices, trial courts can subject legislative facts to far more 
rigorous testing than the current system provides. 
When remand is not possible because time pressures require 
faster resolution of a case,316 there may be circumstances in which it is 
not altogether inappropriate for the court to look at the factual 
records developed by other courts, as the Court did in Citizens 
United.317 But there are important caveats to this suggestion. First, the 
court must ensure—as it failed to do in Citizens United318—that the 
relevant issue was actually in play in the prior litigation and was 
contested by the parties before that court. Second, if it was in play 
and contested, the court should give meaningful notice to the parties 
that it intends to use facts from an outside record and should give 
them at least some opportunity to respond, even if only by filing 
simultaneous letter briefs. 
Another small step would be for courts to spell out, as the district 
court did in the Proposition 8 case,319 the factual findings that are the 
basis for their decisions.320 As I discussed earlier, a significant problem 
 
 314. To be sure, appellate courts, like trial courts, could request supplemental briefing or 
schedule reargument on a specific question, but such departures from general practice occur 
much more frequently at the trial level than at the appellate level. 
 315. Even if amicus participation at the trial court level is currently rare, see supra notes 84–
87 and accompanying text, there is no prohibition against it and thus no reason why district 
court judges cannot encourage it. 
 316. Time pressures may exist because of external circumstances surrounding the case or 
because the statute at issue itself requires expedited review. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(4), 116 Stat. 81, 113–14 (“It shall be the duty of the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the United 
States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of 
the action and appeal.”). 
 317. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra note 120. 
 319. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953–91 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal pending, 
No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). 
 320. Indeed, it might be helpful if district courts also make clear when they think the 
lawyers’ presentations were weak, thus signaling to appellate courts that they did not have 
before them all of the evidence they needed to properly adjudicate the factual disputes. Thus, in 
such cases, if legislative facts end up being dispositive, the appellate court could remand to the 
trial court, which could then encourage better factual development by inviting amicus 
participation. 
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with the adversarial myth is the way in which it hides the distinction 
between adjudicative facts and legislative facts—and thus causes the 
relevance of legislative facts to be ignored in judicial decisionmaking. 
If courts were forced to identify expressly the legislative facts on 
which they have relied, it might increase the likelihood that judges 
would not rest their decisions on unfounded assumptions but instead 
would subject their assumptions to further research and testing, 
whatever form that further research and testing might take. 
Furthermore, that small step would contribute significantly to the 
transparency of the courts’ decisions and would enable the public and 
other governmental actors to understand why the court did what it 
did. To the extent the court’s decision rested on factual premises that 
may be contestable, it would give others an opportunity to try to 
gather more empirical evidence to contest those factual findings. As 
Professor Davis notes, “[T]he difference between appearing to stay 
within the record and frankly acknowledging resort to extra-record 
sources for legislative facts is usually only a difference in the degree 
of articulation of the grounds for decision.”321 Greater transparency in 
court decisions will thus make it more evident when courts are relying 
on extra-record facts. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset, I observed that the most dangerous myths are 
those that are grounded in reality. They are the ones that most easily 
inculcate belief in the myth and prevent discovery of its 
imperfections. The adversarial myth is such a pervasive part of the 
U.S. legal system that it is easy to ignore its imperfections—to write 
them off as inconsequential and trivial. But some of these 
imperfections and tensions should not be so easily ignored: they 
reveal true weaknesses in the way appellate courts address legislative 
facts. 
In this Article, I have argued that one respect in which the 
commitment to adversarialism is more myth than reality is appellate 
court extra-record factfinding—appellate courts’ practice of looking 
outside the record created by the parties before the trial court and 
finding their own facts. As I have demonstrated, this practice occurs 
frequently, particularly at the Supreme Court, and particularly in 
cases raising significant legal issues with the potential for widespread 
 
 321. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 953. 
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impact. Future research could explore empirically just how often 
extra-record factfinding occurs, particularly in the courts of appeals, 
and whether it occurs particularly often in specific types of cases or in 
cases involving specific types of parties. 
I have also argued that the distinction between adjudicative 
facts—party-specific facts—and legislative facts—general facts—helps 
explain why this extra-record factfinding so often occurs. The United 
States’ adversarial system and the practices and rules that go along 
with it were adopted for cases that turn primarily on adjudicative 
facts. They prove far less useful in cases that turn primarily on 
legislative facts, even though such cases make up a significant amount 
of the work done by the federal courts. Again, further empirical 
investigation into the practice of appellate court extra-record 
factfinding—particularly a historical examination of the practice—
could help elucidate the causes of the practice, including the extent to 
which it has become more prevalent as a result of changes in the 
nature of litigation and technological innovation. 
But the causes of the practice are in some sense less important 
than its consequences. Although I have posited several troubling 
consequences that result from appellate court extra-record 
factfinding—and the little-considered way in which it currently 
occurs—there is more room for research. It would be helpful to have 
a richer understanding of how the extra-record nature of appellate 
court factfinding affects the quality of the courts’ factual findings. 
Indeed, although I have assumed that adversarial testing tends to 
produce more accurate factual findings, a sample of cases in which 
courts have engaged in less adversarial-driven factfinding would 
provide an opportunity to test that premise. And it would be helpful 
to have a richer understanding of how this practice affects the way 
appellate court decisions are understood by the public, by the other 
branches, and by subsequent courts. 
Understanding these consequences, of course, is merely a 
precursor to identifying appropriate solutions. Identifying what 
consequences follow—and follow most significantly and frequently—
from the practice of appellate court extra-record factfinding will make 
it possible to identify the most promising potential solutions. I have 
provided some preliminary thoughts on possible solutions here, but 
there is much work that remains to be done, both in determining 
whether those solutions will effectively address the consequences of 
the practice and in ascertaining what other effects those solutions 
might have on the legal system. 
GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/6/2011  6:57:08 PM 
2011] THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH 79 
This is important work, and it requires recognizing that appellate 
court extra-record factfinding is one respect in which the nation’s 
commitment to adversarialism is more myth than reality. To 
recognize this imperfection in the adversarial system is not to destroy 
it. To the contrary, by recognizing the system’s limitations, it becomes 
possible to begin a conversation about how to address them and, in 
the end, make the nation’s legal system stronger. 
 
